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Ratio est legis anima.
("The reason for the law is its soul.'91
I. INTRODUCTION
State antitrust laws are broadly constructed. 2 With sweep-
ing, general terms, often mirroring the language of the federal anti-
trust laws, 3 most state antitrust statutes manifest a legislative de-
sign to prevent-and to punish-a variety of commercial activities
that are anticompetitive in purpose or effect. 4 These statutes, in
conjunction with consumer protection statutes, constitute the pri-
mary vehicles through which state authorities protect consumers
from harmful, anticompetitive behavior. 5 Of course, despite the im-
portance of state antitrust laws in preserving a competitive mar-
ketplace, the Constitution confines their reach. 6 Through the Com-
merce Clause, 7 the Constitution vests in Congress the exclusive
1. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 515.
2. Virtually every state has enacted a fair trade or anti-monopoly statute of general appli.
cation. See A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ANTITRUST PRAcTIcE AND STATUTES 1-18
(Jeffrey L. Kessler & Michael K. Lindsey eds., 2d ed. 1999). In this Note, these statutes are
referred to collectively as "state antitrust laws." For a collection of antitrust laws by state, see
State Laws, 6 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 30,000 (1988).
3. See State v. Sterling Theatres Co., 394 P.2d 226, 228 (Wash. 1964) (noting the "nearly
identical wording" of a Washington statute and the federal Sherman Antitrust Act).
4. Of course, this is a general statement, and there is a great deal of variation in the lan-
guage and construction of state antitrust provisions. See Donald L. Flexner & Mark A. Ra-
canelli, State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the United States: Collision or Harmony?, 9
CONN. J. INVL L. 501, 510 (1994) (finding "little uniformity" among state antitrust laws). In
addition, although state antitrust laws are in the majority of instances similar in structure and
language to the federal statutes, this is not always the case. Id. at 510-11. See generally Mary B.
Cranston & Ellyn Freed, The Tension Between Federal Antitrust and State Unfair Competition
Laws, at 135 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B-968, 1997) (describing
the overall tension between California's antitrust and consumer protection statutes and federal
antitrust laws).
5. See Cranston & Freed, supra note 4, at 137-38 (noting that while the federal antitrust
laws are designed to protect competition alone, state laws, in some cases, serve to protect indi-
vidual competitors in the marketplace).
6. See Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust Enforcement in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND.
L.J. 375, 387 (1983) ('No modern court.., has ruled that state antitrust statutes can be applied
to interstate commerce without limit.").
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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power to regulate interstate commerce. Accordingly, since passage
of the Sherman Act in 1890,8 Congress has promulgated an exten-
sive body of antitrust legislation regulating interstate commercial
conduct.9 Another federal constraint on state antitrust laws arises
through the Supremacy Clause. 10 To the extent that state antitrust
laws conflict with federal legislation in the same field, courts will
find them constitutionally invalid.11
State antitrust statutes, however, are not completely pre-
empted by federal antitrust laws. 12 Instead, the legislative history
accompanying most state and federal antitrust statutes indicates
that the two sets of statutes were designed to function as equally
potent ingredients in a comprehensive protective scheme. 13 In fact,
early federal antitrust legislation directly reflected the policies be-
hind the state antitrust laws of the late nineteenth century; they
also reflected contemporary principles of common law. 14 As coex-
isting and complementary instruments, state and federal antitrust
statutes form an excellent example of the potential for effective
multi-layered legislation. In one court's analysis, the relationship
between the federal and state antitrust laws is a quintessential ex-
ample of "cooperative federalism."'15
Problems arise, however, when attempting to determine ex-
actly how far the reach of state antitrust legislation actually ex-
tends within the federal scheme. Arguably, given the limitations
8. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1994)).
9. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7; Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-19, 26 (1994)); Robinson.Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
13-13b, 21a (1994); Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
10. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
11. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 203-04 (1983); Ray v. At- Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); Fla. Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Mark E. Chadwick, Note, Invigorated State
Merger Enforcement: A Proposed Analytical Framework That Preempts Preemption Problems, 35
ARIZ. L REV. 445,457-59 (1993).
12. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989) (noting "the long history of
state common-law and statutory remedies against monopolies and unfair business practices");
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 404 (1941) (describing the power of states to regulate restraints of
trade as "long-recognized"); Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 375, 378-79; Chadwick, supra note 11,
at 457-59.
13. See ME. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 653, 660 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)
(discussing the history of the Sherman Antitrust Act and emphasizing that Congress did not
intend to preempt consistent state antitrust laws); Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 375, 378-79
(Q[T]he legislative history of the Sherman Act is replete with statements that the Act was de-
signed to supplement rather than to abrogate existing state antitrust enforcement, but to leave
that enforcement itself unaffected.").
14. See Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 378-79.
15. Younger v. Jensen, 605 P.2d 813, 818 (CaL 1980).
VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW
imposed by the Commerce Clause, state antitrust laws should cover
only conduct that is "predominantly intrastate in nature." 6 Appli-
cation of this standard, however, is increasingly problematic in a
modern context. Federal regulatory authority under the Commerce
Clause has expanded significantly throughout the twentieth cen-
tury;17 thus it may be appropriate to reevaluate the validity of
maintaining a strict interstate/intrastate dichotomy in the applica-
tion of antitrust laws. For example, if even discrete, local transac-
tions, through their tangential effect on interstate commerce, are
subject to Congressional regulation, 8 little, if any, commercial be-
havior remains that can fairly be labeled "intrastate commerce."
Defining interstate commerce too broadly will thus leave no trans-
actions in the intrastate category, and state antitrust laws confined
to in-state conduct will become, in effect, dead letters.19
Such an outcome comports neither with the intent of the an-
titrust laws' drafters nor with the idea of coexisting state and fed-
eral legislative schemes. Indeed, even the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that state laws may constitutionally reach transactions
that are on some level "interstate" in nature.20 The extent of this
reach is the primary focus of this Note. Accordingly, this Note ex-
plores how the courts should characterize "intrastate commerce" in
order to preserve the continued viability of state antitrust laws. It
also addresses the extent to which the federal and state antitrust
laws overlap or, in contrast, the extent to which they fatally con-
flict. With an emphasis on the development of the law in Tennessee,
this Note analyzes judicial decisions attempting to determine the
appropriate reach of state antitrust jurisdiction. Relying primarily
upon tradition and legislative intent, some courts have upheld a
rigid division between interstate and intrastate conduct for anti-
16. The obvious argument here is that beyond the realm of intrastate commerce, the Com-
merce Clause governs and state laws should have no application. For examples of decisions
reflecting this straightforward approach, see Kosuga v. Kelly, 257 F.2d 48, 55 (7th Cir. 1958)
(restricting the reach of Illinois' antitrust statute to intrastate commerce); FTC v. Mylan Labs.,
Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 42, 51 (D.D.C. 1999) (confining the reach of Tennessee's antitrust law to
intrastate commerce); Young v. Seaway Pipeline, Inc., 576 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Okla. 1977) ('"Tho
courts of this state have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of an alleged interstate conspir-
acy ...."). This Note argues, however, that this is a dubious position in the modern context.
17. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
18. Id.
19. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 613 (7th Cir.
1997); R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 653, 660 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); Com-
monwealth v. McHugh, 93 N.E.2d 751, 762 (Mass. 1950).
20. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127-29 (1978).
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trust purposes.2 1 If widely adopted, these interpretations-some of
which are anachronistic relics of early twentieth-century jurispru-
dence-could seriously impede the success of future enforcement
claims brought under state antitrust laws. Fortunately, other
courts have invoked a more flexible analysis, defining "intrastate
commerce" so as to preserve the efficacy of state law. 2
This Note argues in favor of expanded application of state
antitrust laws. Part II explores the legal and historical background
surrounding the relationship between state and federal antitrust
laws. This Part emphasizes the resurgence of state authority fol-
lowing the expansion of federal regulatory authority enabled by
twentieth-century Commerce Clause jurisprudence. This resur-
gence resulted in a situation wherein state laws, when broadly ap-
plied, are often a more attractive alternative, and perhaps the only
available option, for certain parties harmed by anticompetitive con-
duct. Part III considers potential problems arising under both the
Supremacy Clause and the negative Commerce Clause. Given the
objectives of state antitrust legislation and its unique relationship
with interstate competition, this part concludes that neither the
supremacy of federal law nor the "burden" of state regulations upon
interstate commerce requires preemption of state antitrust laws.
In Part IV, this Note examines various judicial interpreta-
tions of Tennessee antitrust law and describes the current uncer-
tainty surrounding the appropriate application of Tennessee's
Trade Practices Act. This Note offers an example of a recent case,
FTC v. Mylan Laboratories,23 where the victims of anticompetitive
conduct were left without an adequate remedy due to a narrow and
perhaps erroneous characterization of Tennessee law. An alterna-
tive construction of Tennessee's antitrust laws appears in In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation,24 where the court applied the
Trade Practices Act to any conduct with "more than incidental" in-
state effects, thereby affording more protection for Tennessee pro-
ducers and consumers.25 Part V turns to other jurisdictions for
guidance, specifically analyzing the approaches of various courts
21. See, e.g., Kosuga, 257 F.2d at 55; Mylan, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 51; Abbott Labs. v. Durrett,
746 So. 2d 316, 337-39 (Ala. 1999); Young, 576 P.2d at 1150-51.
22. See, e.g., Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 123 F.3d at 611-13; In re Cardizem CD Anti-
trust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 665-68 (E.D. Mich. 2000); Emergency One, Inc. v. Waterous Co.,
23 F. Supp. 2d 959, 961-67 (E.D. Wisc. 1998); St. Joe Paper Co. v. Superior Ct., 120 Cal. App. 3d
991, 995-1000 (Cal. Ct. App 1981); RE. Spriggs, 37 CaL App. 3d at 657-66; C. Bennett Bldg.
Supplies, Inc. v. Jen Air Corp., 759 S.W.2d 883, 886-91 (Mo. CL App. 1988).
23. Mylan, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 25.
24. Cardizem, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 618.
25. See id. at 667.
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regarding the appropriate reach of state laws into the interstate
arena. This Part highlights the federal courts' expansive applica-
tion of state laws in Emergency One, Inc. v. Waterous Co., Inc. 26 and
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation.?7 Draw-
ing on these opinions and other state court decisions that illustrate
the benefits of a broad application of state antitrust laws, Part VI
argues in favor an effects-based approach that will more success-
fully combat anticompetitive conduct that significantly affects in-
state businesses and consumers. Finally, this Note offers a few sug-
gestions for a broader conception of "intrastate commerce" that re-
flects contemporary trends while sustaining the potency of state
antitrust statutes as appropriate and effective protective instru-
ments.2
8
II. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Sherman Act and State Antitrust Laws
The legislative history surrounding passage of the Sherman
Act indicates Congress' intent to supplement, but not to supplant,
existing state antitrust statutes.29 As Senator Sherman stated at
the time that Congress passed the Sherman Act, the Act did not
"announce a new principle of law, but applie [d] old and well recog-
nized principles of the common law to the complicated jurisdiction
of our State and Federal Government."80 Building on traditions es-
tablished under common law and the example set by the several
states that had previously enacted legislation dealing with re-
straints on trade, 31 Congress designed the Sherman Act "to supple-
ment the enforcement of the established rules."32 According to
26. Emergency One, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 959.
27. Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 123 F.3d at 599.
28. The focus of this Note is upon judicial application of state antitrust laws and the extent
to which their reach is limited. Of course, to the extent that courts are legitimately constrained
by the language of state antitrust statutes themselves, the task of guaranteeing appropriate
antitrust remedies lies in the hands of state legislatures.
29. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 & n.4 (1989); R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Ad-
olph Coors Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 653, 660 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) ("The history of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act makes it clear that the Congress did not intend that the federal legislation preempt
parallel state efforts to control unfair competitive practices."); Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 375.
30. 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
31. See ARC Am., 490 U.S. at 101 & n.4 (noting that over twenty states had enacted their
own antitrust statutes at the time Congress passed the Sherman Act); R.E. Spriggs, 37 Cal. App.
3d at 660.
32. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
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Senator Sherman, the "single object" of the Act was to "arm the
Federal courts... that they may cooperate with the State courts in
checking, curbing and controlling the most dangerous combinations
that now threaten the business, property, and trade of the people of
the United States."33 Clearly, Congress did not initially seek to pre-
empt state authority to regulate harmful, anticompetitive conduct.
Rather, as one observer noted, Congress' intent in passing the fed-
eral antitrust laws was to "leave state antitrust enforcement more
or less intact."3
B. The Breakdown of the Interstate/Intrastate Paradigm
What Congress intended at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, however, is no longer the only, or the most relevant, consid-
eration. Indeed, the legislative intent behind the federal antitrust
laws is increasingly irrelevant in light of the gradual breakdown of
the interstate/intrastate dichotomy.35 States initially assumed the
authority to regulate only those activities occurring entirely within
their borders. 36 Through the early stages of the twentieth century,
this limited power fit with prevailing notions of judicial and legisla-
tive jurisdiction.37 In this context, a complementary, dual-tier anti-
trust enforcement scheme made perfect sense: The federal govern-
ment pursued antitrust actions against combinations and conspira-
cies that were located in more than one state, while state enforce-
ment agencies regulated transactions taking place entirely within a
single state.38 In other words, it was easy to characterize certain
commercial conduct as "intrastate" in nature. Therefore, the reach
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 375.
35. See id. at 378 (suggesting that, given the changes since 1890 in both the economy and
the nature of federalism, issues of congressional intent at the time the Sherman Act was passed
are "virtually moot").
36. Id. at 379-80; see also Ray NV. Campbell, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, in Illinois Institute
for Continuing Legal Education 2 (June, 1996).
37. See Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 379-80; Campbell, supra note 36, at 2. Mhile an
analysis of applicable state jurisdictional standards lies beyond the scope of this Note, it is im-
portant to at least recognize the relationship between the early antitrust laws and contemporary
notions of state jurisdiction. For example, the complementary but distinct regulatory roles envi-
sioned by Senator Sherman for state and federal antitrust laws reflect the overall jurisdictional
scheme outlined by the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff: "The authority of every tribunal is
necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt
to exercise authority beyond those limits would be deemed... an illegitimate assumption of
power, and be resisted as mere abuse." Pennoyer v. Neff 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877).
38. See Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 379; see also Kosuga v. Kelly, 257 F.2d 48, 55 (7th Cir.
1958) (refusing to apply Illinois' antitrust laws to an alleged interstate price-fixing scheme since
the statute was "applicable only to interstate commerce").
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of state laws into the interstate arena was unlikely to represent a
significant concern for either courts or law enforcement.
As the economy modernized, however, this neat paradigm
eroded, and the formerly clear distinction between interstate and
intrastate transactions became increasingly murky.3 9 Meanwhile,
certain instrumental Supreme Court decisions greatly expanded
federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause. 40 As a result, vir-
tually any commercial transaction is subject to federal regulation as
long as Congress could reasonably infer that the transaction has a
significant impact on interstate commerce. 41 Under this modern
standard, very little commercial conduct may fairly be character-
ized as entirely "intrastate" in nature. These developments have
the potential to seriously limit the effectiveness of state antitrust
laws if they are limited in application to intrastate commerce.
39. Again, this evolution mirrored the expansion of state jurisdictional standards in gen-
eral. Eventually dismissing the straightforward paradigm established in Pennoyer, the Supreme
Court in the twentieth century sanctioned the application of state laws to a variety of conduct
taking place beyond state lines. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479-80,
487 (1985) (holding that substantial and continuous contact with a forum state supports jurisdic-
tion over claims arising out of such contact); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774-
75 (1984) (upholding jurisdiction because defendant had purposefully availed itself of the privi-
lege of doing business in-state); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (support-
ing a "minimum contacts" standard and permitting jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants as
long as maintenance of the lawsuit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice"). Significantly, courts in recent jurisdiction cases have increasingly considered in-
state interests, such as providing appropriate remedies to injured state residents. See Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 476-77, 483; Keeton, 465 U.S. at 776-77. This trend may lend some support to
arguments in favor of expanded application of state antitrust laws. For a recent discussion of the
appropriate reach of state long-arm statutes as applied to antitrust defendants, see In re Cardi-
zem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 671-76 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (upholding personal
jurisdiction over defendants under Tennessee and Minnesota long-arm statutes). For additional
analysis of a contacts-based approach to determining the scope of a state's antitrust laws, see
Emergency One, Inc. v. Waterous Co., Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 959, 968-69 (E.D. Wisc. 1998).
40. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (sustaining Congress's con-
clusion that discriminatory serving practices by a local restaurant could have a "direct and ad-
verse effect" on interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
255-58 (1964) (upholding legislation designed to prevent racial discrimination in local accommo-
dations since such discrimination could have a "substantial and harmful effect" on interstate
commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942) (extending regulation under the
Commerce Clause to local activities if Congress concludes that, in the aggregate, they exert a
"substantial economic effect" on interstate commerce). But see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 559, 567-68 (1995) (limiting the reach of the commerce power to activities that "substan-
tially affect interstate commerce and concluding that possession by a student of a firearm
within a school zone fails to meet this test).
41. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04.
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C. Declining Federal Enforcement and the Resurgence of State
Authority
Ironically, while the scope of federal authority under the
Commerce Clause expanded to unprecedented levels, federal anti-
trust enforcement eventually weakened.42 After peaking in the
1960s, federal antitrust actions declined dramatically during the
Reagan Administration. 43 For example, under President Carter,
federal enforcement agencies conducted reviews of 10.8% of all re-
ported mergers from 1979 to 1980.44 From 1982 to 1986, under
President Reagan, these agencies reviewed only 4.4% of reported
mergers. 45 In addition, while enforcement actions were brought
against 2.5% of all mergers from 1979 to 1980, this figure dropped
to 0.7% of all transactions from 1982 to 1986.46
While the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission maintained an increasingly hands-off attitude toward
antitrust enforcement, certain Supreme Court rulings significantly
restricted the scope of federal antitrust authority. One major re-
striction resulted from the Court's holding in Illinois Brick Co. v.
llinois.47 The Supreme Court in that case held that under the Clay-
ton Act, 48 only direct purchasers 49 may recover damages resulting
from violations of the federal antitrust laws. 0 This decision left in-
42. See Flexner & Racanelli, supra note 4, at 503-04, 508 (noting the decline in federal anti-
trust enforcement in the 1980s, due in part to the "minimal investigative attention given to
mergers by the Department of Justice").
43. Chadwick, supra note 11, at 449; Flexner & Racanelli, supra note 4, at 503-04. 508.
44. See Flexner & Racanelli, supra note 4, at 504.
45. Id.
46. Id. (noting further that the rate of federal challenges to mergers declined "from 20.7%
between 1960 and 1980 to 10.4% between 1981 and 1984").
47. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
48. The Clayton Act provides in part: "[A] person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore ... and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained...." 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994).
49. Direct purchasers are those purchasing directly from an antitrust violator. Indirect pur-
chasers, in contrast, are separated from the antitrust violator in the chain of production by one
or more independent sellers. See Michael V. Gisser, Note, Indirect Purchaser Suits Under State
Antitrust Laws: A Detour Around the Illinois Brick Wall, 34 STAN. L REV. 203, 203-05 (1981).
For example, in Illinois Brick, the alleged antitrust violator, a concrete block manufacturer, sold
to masonry contractors, who in turn sold to general contractors. See IL Brick, 431 U.S. at 725-
26. The general contractors eventually sold to respondents, including the State of Illinois, local
government bodies, and school districts. Id. at 726. Collectively, these respondents were "indi-
rect purchasers of concrete block, which passes through two separate levels in the chain of dis-
tribution before reaching respondents." Id.
50. The Court held that only overcharged direct purchasers, and not those farther along the
chain of distribution, are the parties "injured in his business or property" under the Clayton Act.
Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 729. The primary reasons offered by the Court in support of its decision
2001] 1713
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direct purchasers-often the party most seriously harmed by anti-
trust violations-without recourse under federal law.5 1 Thus, as
states faced the encroachment of federal law into areas of commer-
cial conduct previously regulated by state authorities, 2 federal an-
titrust enforcement simultaneously diminished in both breadth and
intensity. The result was a laissez-faire environment in which anti-
competitive conduct was largely unregulated and the victims of
such conduct were frequently left without an effective remedy. 3
In response to this situation, enforcement agencies in vari-
ous states began to reassert their authority in order to combat anti-
trust violators under state law. According to one pair of commenta-
tors, several factors combined to facilitate this resurgence of state
antitrust enforcement. 54 First, in 1976 Congress passed the Crime
Control Act, which provided "seed money" to be used by states to
establish their own antitrust enforcement departments.5 5 Also in
1976, Congress passed the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve-
ments Act, which granted state attorneys general the significant
power to bring antitrust actions as parens patriae on behalf of state
were that barring suits by indirect purchasers would (1) avoid unnecessarily complicated litiga-
tion, (2) provide direct purchasers with incentives to bring private antitrust actions, and (3)
avoid the potential for multiple liability of defendants. Id. at 725-26, 736-38. The Illinois Brick
decision is problematic though, because direct purchasers are often able to "pass on" the over-
charges resulting from anticompetitive agreements to consumers or other indirect purchasors.
While recognizing this problem, the Illinois Brick Court nonetheless relied upon the precedent
established in Hanover Shoe, where the Court refused to recognize a "pass on" defense for anti-
trust violators. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 487-94 (1968)
(rejecting the "passing-on" defense, largely based on the difficulties in determining when, and to
what extent, direct purchasers actually pass on the increased costs they incur at the hands of
antitrust violators). According to the Illinois Brick majority, if a pass-on theory may not be used
defensively by antitrust defendants, a similar theory may not be used offensively by indirect
purchaser plaintiffs against alleged antitrust violators. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 728-36.
51. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his Illinois Brick dissent, consumers, as indirect pur-
chasers, often bare "the brunt of antitrust injuries." Il. Brick, 431 U.S. at 749 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). When this is the case, the compensatory and deterrence purposes of the antitrust
laws are frustrated, since "[i]njured consumers are precluded from recovering damages from
manufacturers, and direct purchasers who act as middlemen have little incentive to sue suppli-
ers so long as they may pass on the bulk of the illegal overcharges to the ultimate consumers,"
Id. This effectively states the problem facing the state of Tennessee in Mylan, in which Tennes-
see, as an indirect purchaser of overpriced pharmaceutical products, was barred from collecting
damages under the federal antitrust laws. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25
(D.D.C. 1999).
52. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
53. As one state official describing this situation observed, "[w]e have been witnessing the
watchdog put to sleep." Flexner & Racanelli, supra note 4, at 508 (quoting New York Attorney
General Robert Adams).
54. Id. at 506-09.
55. Id. at 507.
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citizens. 56 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, state officials be-
came deeply concerned with the apparent abdication of responsibil-
ity on the part of federal enforcement agencies.57
Emboldened with a sense of urgency, the state attorneys
general in 1983 formed the Multistate Antitrust Task Force of the
National Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG Task Force").
This group's objectives included coordination of multistate antitrust
actions, multistate participation in antitrust cases as amici curiae,
lobbying of Congress and state legislatures, and developing common
antitrust policies.59 Under the leadership of the Task Force, states
initiated antitrust enforcement actions at an accelerated pace. 60
Notably, an increasing number of these actions dealt with transac-
tions that were to a significant extent interstate in nature. 61
In addition to the new aggressiveness on the part of state of-
ficials, the Supreme Court proffered multiple decisions in the 1970s
and 1980s reaffirming the states' authority to enforce their own in-
dependent antitrust standards, even if they strayed from the prin-
ciples outlined in the federal antitrust laws. For instance, the Court
confirmed in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland that states have
the power to pass laws that impact interstate commerce without
necessarily violating the Commerce Clause.6 2 Later, in California v.
ARC America, the Court conceded that state antitrust laws are not
as a rule preempted by federal antitrust laws with similar procom-
56. Id. Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, state attorneys general have the authority to
"bring a civil action in the name of such State, as parens patrioe on behalf of natural persons
residing in such state, in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the defen-
dant, to secure monetary relief... for injury sustained by such natural persons to their property
by reason of' certain antitrust violations. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a) (1994). Like the Clayton Act, Hart-
Scott-Rodino is limited by the Illinois Brick decision. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying
text. Thus, suits brought by state attorneys general as parens patriae are permitted only insofar
as the injured consumers are direct, and not indirect purchasers. See Flexner & Racanelli, supra
note 4, at 513 n.65; see also A.B.A., supra note 2, at 1-6 to 1-8 (discussing parens patriae actions
and the direct purchaser limitation).
57. See Flexner & Racanelli, supra note 4, at 508.
58. Id. at 509.
59. Id. at 509-10.
60. Id. at 507-10. See generally Thomas Greene et al, State Antitrust Law and Enforce-
ment, at 957, 959-67 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. BO-009D, 1999)
(describing the recent increase in proactive coordinated enforcement efforts under the leadership
of the NAAG Task Force).
61. See Greene, supra note 60, at 959-63 (citing examples of recent state enforcement ac-
tions against large corporations operating in interstate commerce).
62. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127-29 (1978) (upholding a Maryland
statute designed to regulate the retail gasoline market against claims that the statute impermis-
sibly burdened interstate commerce).
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petitive purposes. 68 The ARC America Court also held that state
laws allowing recovery of damages by indirect purchasers are per-
missible, despite the federal policy established in Illinois Brick.64
Combined with the explicit "Illinois Brick repealer" statutes passed
by several states,65 these decisions empowered state authorities to
more aggressively pursue violators of state antitrust laws. This ag-
gressiveness has resulted in the development of state authorities
into "a de facto third national antitrust enforcement agency."66
D. A Preference for State Antitrust Laws
The resurgence of state authority in the 1980s also provided
new avenues of potential recovery for antitrust plaintiffs. From a
plaintiffs perspective, there are numerous reasons why suing under
state laws might be preferable to the federal alternative. 67 First, as
seen above, the indirect purchaser problem is a substantial obstacle
for victims of vertical agreements 68 that lead to inflated consumer
prices.6 9 The Illinois Brick standard is particularly onerous in that
it denies attorneys general the ability to bring parens patriae ac-
tions in federal courts to obtain relief on behalf of indirect purchas-
ers. 70 In contrast, several states expressly authorize actions by indi-
rect purchasers of illegally overpriced goods. 71 Here, the preference
for state law is a matter of standing; denied the opportunity to sue
under federal law, indirect purchasers must rely on state laws spe-
63. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101-02 (1989) (upholding claims brought
by indirect purchasers of cement, brought under state antitrust laws, against argument that
such claims were preempted by federal antitrust policy).
64. Id. at 103-06.
65. See A.B.A., supra note 2, at 1-19 & n.107.
66. Robert X. Langer, 60 Minutes with Robert M. Langer, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 197, 198
(1991). The Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
have traditionally been responsible for enforcing federal antitrust laws. See Flexner & Racanolli,
supra note 4, at 504-06.
67. See Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 378, 384-85.
68. A vertical agreement is defined as "[a] restraint of trade imposed by agreement between
firms at different levels of distribution (as between manufacturer and retailer)" BLACICS LAW
DIcTIONARY 1316 (7th ed. 1999).
69. See supra notes 50-51.
70. See A.B.A., supra note 2, at 1-6 to 1-8 (discussing parens patriae actions and the direct
purchaser limitation). As one observer has noted, since "most consumers are indirect rather
than direct purchasers, the viability of the parens patriae provision is in doubt." See JULIAN VON
KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION §101.11, at n.11.1 (1992).
71. See A.B.A., supra note 2, at 1-6 to 1-8 (discussing parens patriae actions and the direct
purchaser limitation). Despite the seeming conflict with the precedent established in Illinois
Brick, state indirect purchaser statutes were upheld in California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93,
103-06 (1989).
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cifically creating a cause of action for parties indirectly harmed by
anticompetitive conduct. In other words, state antitrust laws may
constitute the sole means of obtaining adequate relief for indirect
purchasers. Moreover, many states' "Illinois Brick repealer" stat-
utes allow indirect purchasers to recover treble damages, thereby
affording a real remedy to parties who otherwise would be limited
to injunctive relief in the federal courts.7 2 State laws may also pro-
vide more meaningful protection in cases of horizontal restraints on
trade,73 where guidelines published by the NAAG Task Force indi-
cate that thresholds triggering review of certain mergers are lower
on the state level.74 Again, courts have upheld such review notwith-
standing the clear interstate aspects of most mergers in the modern
economy.75
Furthermore, state antitrust statutes, though often inter-
preted by federal standards, 76 are often substantively broader in
scope than federal antitrust law.77 For instance, the Maryland stat-
ute upheld in Exxon included restrictions considerably more strin-
gent than comparable price discrimination provisions in the Robin-
son-Patman Act.78 Similarly, federal courts have upheld California's
price discrimination law even though it is broader and demands a
higher level of price uniformity than Robinson-Patman.79 Other
72. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (%Vest 1997); 740 ILL. CO.P. STAT. 1017(2)
(Vest 1993).
73. A horizontal agreement is defined as "[a] restraint of trade imposed by agreement be-
tween competitors at the same level of distribution. The restraint is horizontal not because it has
horizontal effects, but because it is the product of a horizontal agreement." BLCICS LAW
DICTIONARY 1316 (7th ed. 1999).
74. See Flexner & Racanelli, supra note 4, at 514-16.
75. See id. at 529-30 (noting that state antitrust enforcement agencies have not "refrained
from flexing their muscle in cases which have effects and significance reaching far beyond their
borders").
76. Id. at 511; La. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 493 So. 2d 1149, 1158
(La. 1986) (stating that federal interpretations, though not controlling, should be a "persuasive
influence" on state interpretation).
77. See Flexner & Racanelli, supra note 4, at 511; Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 377 n.10
(citing various examples of state antitrust provision that reach beyond the scope of comparable
federal laws).
78. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 129-31 (1978). While Robinson-Patman
generally prohibits price discrimination "between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality," 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1994), the Maryland statute at issue in Exxon required
producers or refiners of petroleum products to extend all temporary price restrictions uniformly
to all service stations in the state supplied by the producers or refiners. See Exxon, 437 U.S. at
120, n.1 (presenting the text of the Maryland statute). The Ezxon Court disagreed with appel-
lants' argument that complying with the statute's uniformity requirements would, in some cases,
violate Robinson-Patman. Id. at 129-31.
79. See Shell Oil Co. v. Younger, 587 F.2d 34, 3G (9th Cir. 1978) (relying on Exxon and
finding no reason for preemption since the basic purposes of the state and federal laws are simi-
lar).
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reasons why antitrust plaintiffs might opt for state law include
more agreeable procedural rules, a more favorable jury venire, the
desire to avoid consolidation in multidistrict federal litigation, or
even a more sympathetic bench.80 Taking such considerations into
account, state antitrust laws often constitute the only real option
for certain parties significantly harmed by antitrust violations. 81
According to one commentator, by the mid-1980s it was "no longer a
foregone conclusion that if an effect on interstate commerce is pres-
ent, a plaintiff would fare better under federal law than in a state
court under state law."8 2
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Supremacy Clause
Despite the appeal of state antitrust laws to potential plain-
tiffs, opposing litigants have continually questioned the constitu-
tionality of such laws under the Supremacy Clause. 83 In many
cases, they have lost. 84 Generally, the "supremacy" of federal law
preempts state regulations only if (1) Congress states an intention
to preempt state law in express terms ("express preemption"), 85 (2)
Congress enacts a scheme of regulation in a particular field that is
80. See Campbell, supra note 36, at 2; Greene, supra note 60, at 965; Hovenkamp, supra
note 6, at 384-85.
81. See Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 378 CThe result of these related phenomena is that
pe6ple who at one time would naturally have carried their antitrust complaints to federal court
now choose state court, even though the alleged illegal acts were clearly in interstate commerco,
or were committed outside the state whose law is being applied.").
82. Id. at 384.
83. The Supremacy Clause provides: 'Th[e] Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. For a general discussion of
the appropriate application of the Supremacy Clause in the antitrust context, see Michael Co-
nant, The Supremacy Clause and State Economic Controls: The Antitrust Maze, 10 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 255 (1983) (criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341 (1943), which created antitrust immunity for certain state regulatory statutes that conflict
with the Sherman Act).
84. Most notable here is the Supreme Coures explicit refusal to compel states to abide by
the indirect purchaser rule outlined in Illinois Brick. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S.
93, 103-06 (1989) (upholding state indirect purchaser statutes against claim of federal preemp-
tion); see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 78-87 (1987) (denying federal
preemption of Indiana's takeover statute); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 129.34
(1978) (rejecting appellants' contention that compliance with Maryland law would require viola-
tion of the Robinson-Patman Act).
85. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 203 (1983).
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"so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the state to supplement it" ("field preemption"),8 or (3)
the state law "actually conflicts with a valid federal statute" ("con-
flict preemption").87 Certainly Congress has not articulated a desire
to fully preempt state antitrust laws. Moreover, as demonstrated
above, the history and purpose behind the major federal antitrust
provisions indicate an absence of Congressional intent to occupy the
entire field of antitrust regulation to the exclusion of the states.88
Upholding the viability of state indirect purchaser laws in ARC
America, the Supreme Court stated that "[g]iven the long history of
state common-law and statutory remedies against monopolies and
unfair business practices, it is plain that this is an area tradition-
ally regulated by the states."8 9
The most plausible challenges to state antitrust provisions
involve claims of field or conflict preemption. In cases such as
Exxon and ARC America, however, the Supreme Court has indi-
cated its willingness to uphold state antitrust laws even when they
reach beyond the scope of analogous federal statutes.90 In Exxon, for
example, the appellate oil companies argued that, by imposing cer-
tain price restrictions, the Maryland statute at issue9' could poten-
tially lead to "discrimination between customers who would other-
wise receive the same price."92 The oil companies claimed this
would violate the anti-price discrimination policy of the Robinson-
Patman Act.93 Despite this potential "conflict," however, the Exxon
86. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); accord Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at
204; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 (1941) (holding that field preemption may also result
when Congress regulates in a field "in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject").
87. Ray v. AtL Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); accord Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at 204; Fla.
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (explaining that conflict pre-
emption exists "where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossi-
bility"); Hines, 312 U.S. at 67 (stating conflict preemption occurs where state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress").
88. See Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 404 (1941) (holding that nothing in the language or
legislative history of federal copyright laws justified depriving the state of Florida of the "long
recognized power to regulate combinations in restraint of trade"); see also supra notes 29-34 and
accompanying text.
89. ARC Am., 490 U.S. at 101; see Greene, supra note 60, at 985 ("Because of the legislative
history of the federal antitrust laws, [Supremacy Clause] preemption has had an extremely lim-
ited role in antitrust.").
90. See supra notes 62-66, 78 and accompanying text. The analysis applied by the Supreme
Court in any claim of preemption in the antitrust context is based upon the Courts opinion in
Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659-63 (1982).
91. For the text of the Maryland statute, see Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117,
120 n.1 (1978).
92. Id. at 130.
93. Id. at 130-34.
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Court refused to agree that Robinson-Patman preempted the
Maryland statute.94 Instead, it upheld the statute as a legitimate
expression of state authority. According to the Court:
[I]t is illogical to infer that by excluding certain competitive behavior from the
general ban against discriminatory pricing, Congress intended to pre-empt the
State's power to prohibit any conduct within that exclusion. This Court is gener-
ally reluctant to infer pre-emption ... and it would be particularly inappropriate
to do so in this case because the basic purposes of the state statute and the Robin-
son-Patman Act are similar. Both reflect a policy choice favoring the interest in
equal treatment of all customers over the interest in allowing sellers freedom to
make selective competitive decisions.95
In upholding the validity of state laws allowing claims by indirect
purchasers-despite the precedent established by Illinois Brick-
the ARC America Court maintained a similar position.9 6 Noting
that state laws permitting indirect purchaser recovery are entirely
consistent with the purpose of the federal antitrust laws, 97 the
Court reversed the opinion of the Court of Appeals that federal law
preempted indirect purchaser statutes.98 "Ordinarily," the Court
held, "state causes of action are not pre-empted solely because they
impose liability over and above that authorized by federal law...
and no clear purpose of Congress indicates that we should decide
otherwise in this case. 99
The Court's stance in these cases is logically correct, for de-
spite the apparent "conflict" between federal antitrust law and
more aggressive state provisions, the objectives of both schemes are
basically the same: protecting fair trade and ensuring a competitive
marketplace. 00 That legislatures in various states have in some
instances elected to surpass the enforcement standards established
94. See id. at 131 (This sort of hypothetical conflict is not sufficient to warrant pro-
emption.").
95. Id. at 132-33.
96. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 103 (1989) ("Nothing in Illinois Brick
suggests that it would be contrary to congressional purposes for States to allow indirect purchas-
ers to recover under their own antitrust laws.").
97. See id. at 102 ("State laws to this effect are consistent with the broad purposes of the
federal antitrust laws: deterring anticompetitive conduct and ensuring the compensation of vic-
tims of that conduct.").
98. Id. at 101-06.
99. Id. at 105.
100. See State v. Lawn King, Inc., 417 A.2d 1025, 1032 (N.J. 1980) (requiring "consonance"
between state and federal law); State v. Sterling Theatres Co., 394 P.2d 226, 228 (Wash. 1964)
(observing that the similarity between the Sherman Act and Washington's Consumer Protection
Act "indicates that the motive or goal of federal and state regulation is the same, and leads to the
conclusion that state enforcement, far from frustrating or interfering with federal purpose or
national policy, actually furthers it").
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by federal law should not be justification for preemption. 0 1 Rather,
the determining factor is whether there exists an "irreconcilable
conflict between the federal and state regulatory regimes."10 2 Con-
sidering the mutually reinforcing nature of the state and federal
antitrust schemes, it is unremarkable that courts have been "ex-
traordinarily reluctant" to hold state antitrust laws preempted un-
der notions of federal supremacy. 10 3
B. The Negative Commerce Clause and Interstate Commerce
More problematic issues arise when courts analyze state an-
titrust laws under the Commerce Clause. As previously suggested,
the reach of the Congressional power under the modern Commerce
Clause could potentially stultify state enforcement abilities if courts
limit application of state antitrust statutes to commerce that is en-
tirely intrastate in nature. 104 Recognizing this problem, most recent
decisions have upheld state antitrust regulations despite their inci-
dental impact on interstate commerce. 105 Courts have refrained,
however, from issuing a general declaration that states may issue
laws affecting interstate commerce without limitation. 106 The prob-
lem thus becomes one of drawing a line between state laws that
have an acceptable impact on interstate commerce and those that
are unduly burdensome. Determining an adequate solution to this
101. Significantly, the Supreme Court has held that even state legislation that adversely af-
fects competition will not necessarily be preempted by the federal antitrust laws. See Rice v.
Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1989) (CA state regulatory scheme is not preempted...
simply because in a hypothetical situation a private party's compliance with the statute might
cause him to violate the antitrust laws. A state statute is not preempted... simply because the
state scheme might have an anticompetitive effect .... A party may successfully enjoin the
enforcement of a state statute only if the statute on its face irreconcilably conflicts with federal
antitrust policy.").
102. Id.; accord C. Bennett Bldg. Supplies, Inc. v. Jean Air Corp., 759 S.V.2d 883, 889 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1988) (arguing against preemption unless there is "specific state frustration of strong
federal policy").
103. Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 403; see Campbell, supra note 36, at 6 (claiming that the
ARC American decision "makes clear the reluctance of the Supreme Court to preempt state
law"). Again, this reluctance derives largely from the Supreme Courts general presumption
against preemption of state laws under the Supremacy Clause. Hillsborough County v. Auto-
mated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 716 (1985).
104. See Commonwealth v. McHugh, 93 N.E.2d 751, 762 (Mass. 1950) ('If State laws have no
force as soon as interstate commerce begins to be affected, a very large area will be fenced off in
which the States will be practically helpless to protect their citizens, without... any corre-
sponding contribution to the national welfare.").
105. See Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 386-87.
106. See id. at 387. But see Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1971) C'Our difficulty
lies in determining to what extent if at all, the states are precluded from antitrust regulation of
interstate commerce.").
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problem is necessary if the vitality of state antitrust laws is to be
preserved. 107
Nowhere in the text of the Constitution does it explicitly
prohibit states from regulating interstate commerce. 108 Precedent
establishes, however, that state regulations violate the "negative,"
or "dormant," Commerce Clause when they unduly impede upon
interstate commerce. 09 In determining whether a given state
regulation impermissibly burdens interstate commerce, courts fre-
quently employ the balancing test originally announced in Pike v.
Bruce Church.1 0 Under this standard, if a state law reflects a le-
gitimate local concern and its regulations are neither discrimina-
tory nor protectionist, courts will uphold it."' If, on the other hand,
a court finds the burden on interstate commerce excessive relative
to local benefits, the court will strike it down as an impermissible
violation of the negative Commerce Clause." 2
Unfortunately, application of the Pike balancing test is inevi-
tably a highly subjective process, and courts must still analyze
state antitrust statutes on a case-by-case basis."8 Despite guidance
from precedent, courts interpreting state antitrust provisions that
affect interstate commerce often have little to guide them beyond
vague perceptions of legislative intent and judges' own subjective
notions of the appropriate distinction between interstate and intra-
state commerce." 4 Unfortunately, neither of these tools is particu-
larly enlightening. As in the case of the Sherman Act, legislative
intent at the time many state antitrust provisions were passed is
107. See Campbell, supra note 36, at 8 (concluding that the appropriate reach of state anti-
trust laws is an "important live issue").
108. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987); GERALD GUNTHER &
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 259 (13th ed. 1997); James E. Gaylord, Note,
State Regulatory Jurisdiction and the Internet: Letting the Dormant Commerce Clause Lie, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1095, 1106 (1999).
109. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't. of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994); Kassel v. Consol.
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Gaylord,
supra note 108, at 1107-08.
110. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
111. See id. at 142 ('Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate lo-
cal public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.").
112. Id. For an example of a decision striking down a state measure as a violation of the
negative Commerce Clause, see Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-46 (1982) (declaring an
Illinois anti-takeover statute unconstitutional under the Pike balancing test).
113. See Chadwick, supra note 11, at 458.
114. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (Scalia, J., concurring) (sug-
gesting that because it requires such subjectivity, the Pike balancing inquiry "is ill suited to the
judicial function and should be undertaken rarely if at all").
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increasingly irrelevant in a modern context.115 Furthermore, the
breakdown of a clear interstate/intrastate dichotomy presents even
the most astute judges with a difficult dilemma: They must either
apply concepts of purely interstate or purely intrastate commerce
that are grossly anachronistic, or invent a new test to determine
whether or not the state law in question represents an appropriate
exercise of state authority." 6 In fashioning such tests, some courts
have produced guidelines for application of state antitrust laws that
are appropriate and effective in a modern context."17 Conversely,
others have held to a restricted interpretation of state laws, re-
sulting in the denial of appropriate remedies to parties harmed by
antitrust violations. 118
IV. INTERPRETING TENNESSEE LAW: A PROBLEMATIC
STANDARD?
An examination of how various courts have interpreted Ten-
nessee's antitrust statutes highlights the problems that result when
courts attempt to apply outdated standards to today's complex legal
issues. Unfortunately, the absence of clear guidance from the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court has led to interpretations of Tennessee law
that neglect important economic and legal developments and deny
victims of anticompetitive conduct the relief they deserve. A closer
look at some of these interpretations illustrates the need for a more
effective standard for applying state antitrust laws to interstate
commerce.
115. Again, this is a function of the economic, social, and constitutional changes taking place
since the passage of many state antitrust laws. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
The extent to which the language of these statutes has remained intact over time most likely
reflects legislative reinterpretations, rather than approval by current legislatures of the intent of
the original drafters.
116. Professor Hovenkamp suggests that the decline of the interstatelintrastate distinction
and the strong arguments against a finding of federal presumption creates a situation in which
"there are virtually no operative limits on the reach of state antitrust law under the commerce
clause." Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 390. This observation may be increasingly accurate in a
modern context, but it is unlikely that most judges would interpret state antitrust law so
broadly.
117. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 611-13
(7th Cir. 1997); St. Joe Paper Co. v. Superior Ct., 120 Cal. App. 3d 991, 995-1000 (Cal. Ct. App
1981); R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 653, 657-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); C.
Bennett Bldg. Supplies, Inc. v. Jenn Air Corp., 759 S.W.2d 883, 886-91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). For
a more thorough examination of these cases and their significance, see infra Part V.
118. For examples of such interpretations (in addition to the Tennessee decisions discussed
below), see Kosuga v. Kelly, 257 F.2d 48, 55 (7th Cir. 1958); Abbott Labs. v. Durrett, 746 So. 2d
316 (Ala. 1999); Young v. Seaway Pipeline, Inc., 576 P.2d 1148, 1150-51 (Okla. 1977).
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A. Case in Point: FTC v. Mylan Laboratories
An example of a recent opinion based upon questionable
treatment of Tennessee's antitrust statutes is FTC v. Mylan Labo-
ratories, Inc.119 In Mylan, the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia presided over a consolidated action involving claims brought
by the FTC and the attorneys general of several states.12 0 In the
state law portion of his opinion, Judge Thomas F. Hogan tersely
dismissed Tennessee's antitrust claims,' 21 supporting his decision
with the conclusory statement that "[w]hen the challenged conduct
occurs before the products arrive in Tennessee, the conduct is con-
sidered interstate in nature and [state law] should not apply."122
This application of Tennessee law is arguably based upon a mis-
taken interpretation of relevant Tennessee precedent. 23 Moreover,
it reflects outdated judicial notions of the proper extension of state
antitrust law into the interstate arena.
In Mylan, Tennessee and thirty-one other states brought
state law claims against the manufacturer of the generic drugs lo-
razepam and clorazepate, as well as the primary supplier of the ac-
tive ingredient in these drugs. 124 The states claimed that the defen-
dant companies had violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and
various state antitrust laws, and they brought action as parens pa-
triae on behalf of state citizens, on behalf of their states' general
economies, and as injured purchasers or reimbursers under state
health care programs. 25 Specifically, the states' complaint alleged
that defendant, Mylan Laboratories, entered into illegal exclusive
licensing agreements with the supplier of the active ingredients for
lorazepam and clorazepate. 126 These agreements resulted in price
increases for the two drugs, which ranged from 1,900% to 3,200%.127
Tennessee brought its state antitrust claims under the Trade Prac-
tices Act ("TPA"), 28 which forbids, in part, all combinations or
119. FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 1999), reconsidered in part by FTC
v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999).
120. Id. at 32-34.
121. Id. at 51. Upon reconsideration, Judge Hogan upheld the dismissal.
122. Id.
123. See infra Parts IV.C-D.
124. Mylan, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 32-34. Lorazepam is used to treat anxiety, tension, agitation,
insomnia, and as a preoperative sedative. Id. at 33-34. Clorazepate is used to treat anxiety and
in therapy for nicotine and opiate withdrawal. Id. at 34.
125. Id. at 32.
126. Id. at 34.
127. Id. These sudden price increases eventually cost the State of Tennessee millions of dol-
lars.
128. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-101 (1995).
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agreements "which tend to lessen, full and free competition in the
importation or sale of articles imported into this state.., or which
tend to advance, reduce, or control the price or the cost to the pro-
ducer or the consumer of any such product or article."'1
The defendants argued that challenges to interstate conduct
brought under state antitrust laws must be dismissed if the rele-
vant state law applies only to intrastate violations. 130 Accordingly,
Judge Hogan concluded that four of the suing states, including
Tennessee, "have determined that their state antitrust statutes ap-
ply only to violations having solely intrastate impact."3 1 This con-
clusion, used to justify the dismissal of Tennessee's claims, appears
to be inaccurate.13 2 The existing case law reveals that Tennessee
courts have not determined the precise reach of the TPA; and to the
extent that the precedent cases attempt to define this reach, they
have not required that the challenged anticompetitive conduct must
be "solely" intrastate in nature.1 33 Rather, the prevailing standard
in Tennessee is apparently based on a "predominance"
requirement.134 Upon reconsideration, Judge Hogan seemed to rec-
ognize as much, since his language reflected a "predominance"
standard rather than one requiring that the challenged conduct be
"solely" intrastate in nature.135 In any case, the Mylan decisions are
based on principles outlined in Tennessee decisions nearly a cen-
tury old and of questionable value today.
129. Id. The TPA provides, in full
All arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts or combinations between per-
sons or corporations made with a view to lessen, or which tend to lessen, full
and free competition in the importation or sale of articles imported into this
state, or in the manufacture or sale of articles of domestic growth or of domestic
raw material, and all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combina-
tions between persons or corporations designed, or which tend, to advance, re-
duce, or control the price or the cost to the producer or the consumer of any
such product or article, are declared to be against public policy, unlawful, and
void.
Id.
130. See Mylan, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (summarizing defendants' argument that "state law
challenges to the interstate conduct alleged here must be dismissed if the state law applies only
to intrastate violations of law").
131. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
132. At least one federal district court strongly disagrees with Judge Hogans interpretation
of Tennessee law. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 666-68 (E.D.
Mich. 2000) (criticizing Mylan and providing an alternative interpretation of Tennessee prece-
dent). For further discussion of this opinion and its evaluation of the reasoning employed in
Mylan, see infra Part IV.D.
133. See infra Parts IV.C-E.
134. See infra notes 158-72 and accompanying text.
135. See FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (stating that Tennessee
law is inapplicable to "predominantly interstate" conduct).
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B. Applying Precedent: Standard Oil Co. v. State
In reaching its decision, the Mylan court relied upon Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. State, a Tennessee Supreme Court opinion issued in
1907.136 In Standard Oil, the court upheld the constitutionality of a
1903 Tennessee antitrust law with language nearly identical to that
of the TPA.' 37 While it found that the statute constituted a valid
expression of state authority, the Standard Oil court simultane-
ously confined the statute's reach. 13 8 "[W]hen properly construed,"
the Tennessee Supreme Court claimed, "[the statute] does not apply
to interstate commerce." 139 In reaching this conclusion, the court
took great pains to emphasize the legislative history behind the
statute and the legal and historical context in which it was
passed. 40 According to the court, the sole purpose of the act was "to
correct and prohibit abuses of trade within the state. This was the
legislative intent and [it] will prevail over the literal meaning of
words or terms found in the act."14'
One important conclusion reached by the Standard Oil
court-arguably correct in 1907, but less so today-involved the
appropriate interpretation of the term "importation" and of the
phrase "imported into this state."142 Again, the court emphasized
that such language should be construed to reflect legislative intent
over literal meaning.143 At the turn of the century, the Standard Oil
court observed, the Tennessee legislature was surely aware of both
the Commerce Clause and the recently enacted Sherman Act.144
Therefore, the court assumed that the purpose behind the state an-
titrust legislation could only have been to address "[t]he wrongs to
trade ... which Congress could not reach."'45 This meant that the
references in the Tennessee statute to "importation" and "imported
136. Standard Oil Co. v. State, 100 S.W. 705 (Tenn. 1907).
137. Id. at 709-12. For the text of the 1903 statute at issue in the case, see id. at 706-07.
138. Id. at 709.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 709-12.
141. Id. at 709.
142. Id. at 710-11.
143. Id. at 709. The court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Rector of Holy
Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), where the Court set forth the general rule
"that a thing may be within the letter of a statute and yet not within the statute, because not
within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers .... It is the duty of the courts, under
these circumstances, to say that, however broad the language of the statute may be, the act,
although within the letter, is not within the intention of the Legislature, and therefore cannot be
within the statute." Id. at 459, 472.
144. Standard Oil, 100 S.W. at 710.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
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into this state" could relate only to articles that had come to rest in
Tennessee before any alleged antitrust violations occurred. 146 In
other words, once products from other states or foreign nations
reached Tennessee and became "comingled with the common mass
of property in this state, and no longer articles of interstate com-
merce,"147 they became subject to state regulation.1 8 If, however,
the "importation" took place at a point in time after an anticompeti-
tive agreement had been formed, state law could have no effect;
otherwise the state law would impermissibly burden an interstate
transaction.149 In order to avoid such an unconstitutional construc-
tion of Tennessee's antitrust law-one which the Tennessee legisla-
ture could not have intended-the Standard Oil court held that
"the importation of articles was not the inducement of the enact-
ment of the statute [and] that the primary and chief purpose...
beyond all question, was to protect commerce within the state."15 0
The purpose of the Standard Oil court's linguistic wran-
gling-preserving legislative intent-was certainly legitimate, but
the precedent established by the court in 1907 is of dubious validity
today. As discussed above, the legislative intent behind the earliest
state antitrust laws is "virtually moot" given subsequent changes in
both the national economy and the relationship between state and
federal authority in the federal scheme. 15 1 Clearly, the state and
federal antitrust laws no longer exist in separate realms, and state
laws are not entirely restricted to transactions "that Congress could
not reach."5 2 Tennessee's antitrust provisions have been amended
several times, and the original language has primarily survived in-
tact,153 but one could fairly doubt the conclusion that current legis-
lative interpretations of TPA's language closely parallel those of a
century ago.
The court's construction of Tennessee law in Mylan is a ves-
tige of a former time. Citing Standard Oil, Judge Hogan found the
TPA inapplicable to the allegedly illegal licensing contracts be-
tween Mylan Laboratories and its supplier because these agree-
146. See id. at 710-12 ("We give no force to the word 'importation' ... becau-s we think it was
inaccurately used....").
147. Id. at 711.
148. Id. at 712.
149. Id. at 710-12.
150. Id. at 711.
151. See supra Part ILB.
152. See Standard Oil, 100 S.W. at 710.
153. For the various incarnations of the Tennessee antitrust statute, see 1891 Tenn. Pub.
Acts, ch. 218, § 1; 1903 Tenn. Acts, ch. 40, § 1; Shan., § 3185; Code of 1932, § 5880; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 69-101 (1955).
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ments materialized before Mylan's products-the overpriced
clorazepam and lorazepate-came to rest in Tennessee and became
"comingled' with mass of property in the state. 54 Because it took
place "before the products arrive[d] in Tennessee," the challenged
conduct was interstate in nature and the court dismissed Tennes-
see's state law claims. 155 Thus construed, state antitrust laws will
or will not apply based upon certain facts surrounding the location
and timing of the alleged illegal agreements. Meanwhile, the anti-
competitive nature of the challenged agreement and its potential
effects on in-state parties become secondary afterthoughts. One
must question whether in these circumstances the real intent be-
hind the antitrust laws is genuinely being served. When first en-
acted, Tennessee's antitrust law may indeed have simply filled a
legal void that existed due to the limited reach of federal jurisdic-
tion. The Mylan decision, however, by constraining state authority
in the name of preserving distinctions between state and federal
jurisdiction that are no longer appropriate, seems to defeat the ul-
timate purpose of preventing and punishing illegal anticompetitive
conduct.
C. Subsequent Tennessee Decisions
Perhaps the Mylan court felt compelled to follow the Stan-
dard Oil court's interpretation of Tennessee's antitrust laws, but
there may have been a legitimate alternative position. Based on
subsequent Tennessee precedent, it is plausible to argue that the
TPA applies to certain conduct that is interstate in nature. Signifi-
cantly, even the Standard Oil court conceded that state laws neces-
sarily will have at least some impact in the interstate arena:
A combination affecting interstate commerce is none the less a violation of the fed-
eral antitrust statute and punishable under it because the agreement made inci-
dentally affects intrastate commerce; and the same rule will apply to combinations
made in violation of the statute of the state upon the same subject where inter-
state commerce is incidentally affected. If it were otherwise, neither the federal
nor the state laws could be enforced in any case.)
This passage, prescient in 1907, becomes increasingly relevant as
the interstate/intrastate dichotomy breaks down. The Tennessee
Court of Appeals seemingly agreed when it concluded in 1982 that
"[the old constitutional doctrine of mutual" exclusivity between
154. FTC v. Mylan Labs. Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 51 (D.D.C. 1999).
155. Id.
156. Standard Oil, 100 S.W. at 712.
1728 [Vol. 54:4:1705
2001] AVOIDING IMPOTENCE 1729
state and federal laws affecting commerce has long been
rejected."1 57 In Lynch Display Corp. v. National Souvenir Center,
Inc., the court announced that Tennessee's antitrust laws were
properly applied to transactions "predominantly intrastate in char-
acter."158 The Lynch court's "predominance" standard could perhaps
be viewed as nothing more than a renewed articulation of the
precedent established in Standard Oil, but it clearly refutes Judge
Hogan's initial statement limiting application of the TPA to trans-
actions that have a "solely" intrastate effect. 15 9 It may further sug-
gest, however, that Tennessee courts are willing to adopt a more
flexible standard in response to changing circumstances. 160
The Tennessee Court of Appeals revisited the issues sur-
rounding application of the TPA in Dzik & Dzik v. Vision Service
Plan, a 1989 case involving allegations of antitrust violations made
by a Tennessee corporation against a Georgia corporation. 161 After
reviewing the legislative history behind the Standard Oil decision,
the Dzik court applied the "predominantly intrastate in character"
standard announced in Lynch.162 While conceding that the transac-
tions between the two parties implicated intrastate commerce, the
court held that such intrastate effects were "of a nature only inci-
dental to the predominant agreement," which itself was clearly in-
157. Lynch Display Corp. v. Nat'l Souvenir Ctr., Inc., 640 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1982).
158. Id. In Lynch, the court considered the appropriateness of applying Tennessee's anti-
trust statute to lease agreements between a wax museum and a manufacturer of wax figures.
See id. at 839. The court concluded that the statute did not apply because "the predominant
character of [the] agreements is in interstate commerce." Id. at 841.
159. Mylan, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 42.
160. In 1994, the District Court for the Western District of Tennessee relied on Lynch in
dismissing a claim brought under the TPA. See Valley Prods. Co., Inc. v. Landmark, 877 F. Supp.
1087, 1094-95 (W.D. Tenn. 1994) (stating that the conduct challenged in the case "clearly in-
volves significant interstate commerce and activity and only minimally affects intrastate com-
merce"). Notably, though, the court introduced a slightly altered standard, stating that the TPA
applies to matters that "more than incidentally affect intrastate commerce." Id. at 1095. Again,
this may be viewed as a reiteration of the standard initially used in Standard Oil. Taken liter-
ally, though, a "more than incidental" test arguably allows for expanded application of state law.
In fact, this is exactly what occurred in the Cardizent opinion discussed infra. See infra Part
1V.D.
161. Dzik & Dzik, P.C. v. Vision Serv. Plan, 1989 VL 3082 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan 20, 1989).
Plaintiff, a Tennessee professional corporation, had provided various optometric services through
defendanes group insurance plan. Id. at *1. When the defendant informed the plaintiff that it
no longer wished to use plaintiffs services, plaintiff sued under the TPA. Id. Specifically plain-
tiff claimed that defendant required plaintiff to purchase products from laboratories other than
those owned by plaintiff Id. This resulted in slower, lower quality service, which made it diffi-
cult for plaintiff to compete. Id.
162. Id. at*2.
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terstate in nature. 163 The claims at issue therefore fell within the
reach of the Sherman Act, and accordingly, the court upheld the
trial court's dismissal. 164 Apparently finding the facts in Dzik
analogous to the situation presented in Mylan, Judge Hogan cited
the Dzik case as authority for his order of dismissal. 165 Later, he
relied primarily upon Dzik's "predominantly intrastate" standard in
denying Tennessee's motion for a rehearing: "The states' complaint
... alleges a price-fixing conspiracy that operated on a national
level and affected at least 32 states. The allegations therefore con-
cern conduct that was predominantly interstate, and outside the
ambit of Tennessee's antitrust laws." 66
Prior to Mylan, the most recent Tennessee decision involving
the TPA and the intrastate/interstate problem was Blake v. Abbott
Laboratories.16 7 This case involved an allegation of conspiracy
among the defendant companies that resulted in gross overcharges
to consumers who purchased baby food formula in Tennessee. 16 8
Blake is therefore significant since it involves anticompetitive con-
duct that closely parallels the challenged conduct in Mylan.169 It is
also relevant because the Blake court reversed the trial court's dis-
missal of the alleged state antitrust claims despite defendants' in-
sistence that the plaintiffs' complaint alleged a price-fixing scheme
that occurred outside of Tennessee and, presumably, before the
relevant products arrived within state borders. 170 In this light,
Blake arguably refutes the interpretation in Standard Oil that the
"importation" referred to in the TPA must always precede the for-
mation of the alleged anticompetitive agreement. Ultimately,
though, the Blake decision did not deviate significantly from the
"predominance" standard relied upon in Lynch and Dzik;171 thus the
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 51 (D.D.C. 1999)
166. FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1999)
167. Blake v. Abbott Lab., Inc., 1996 WL 134947 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 27, 1996).
168. Id. at **1-2.
169. Id. at *1. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' arrangement caused the price of
infant formula sold across the United States, and in Tennessee in particular, to be "raised, fixed,
maintained and stabilized at artificially high and non-competitive levels." Id. As in Mylan, the
case thus involved an out-of-state pricing scheme that seriously impacted in-state purchasers.
170. Id. at *4 (The question.., is not whether the plaintiffs claim is, in fact, predominately
intrastate commerce or predominately interstate commerce, but whether the plaintiffs complaint
states a claim cognizable under the laws of the State of Tennessee. We hold that it does.").
171. See id. at *5 CIf it is later determined by some manner cognizable under Tennessee law
that the actions complained of ... predominantly affect interstate commerce, the defendants
must prevail on this issue.").
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case does little to clarify the standards for proper application of the
TPA.172
D. An Alternative Approach: In re Cardizem OD Antitrust
Litigation
In contrast to the narrow approach taken by the courts in
Mylan and Dzik, one federal court has offered a more liberal con-
struction of Tennessee's antitrust statute. 73 In In re Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litigation, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan analyzed Tennessee precedent in order to determine the
appropriate reach of the TPA.174 Basing its decision on the plain
language of the statute, and emphasizing the in-state effects of an-
ticompetitive conduct, the Cardizem court refused to limit applica-
tion of the TPA to transactions "predominantly intrastate" in char-
acter. 175 Instead, the court concluded that the TPA applies to "anti-
competitive conduct occurring outside the state but having more
than an incidental effect on interstate commerce." 176
In Cardizem, the manufacturer of the brand name prescrip-
tion heart medication Cardizem CD entered into an allegedly anti-
competitive agreement with the manufacturer of the drug's first
generic equivalent approved for sale by the FDA. 177 This horizontal
agreement delayed the introduction of the generic drug into the
U.S. market, effectively protecting the manufacturer of Cardizem
172. The recent Microsoft litigation has spawned a subsequent Tennessee opinion addressing
the proper scope of the TPA. See Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp., 2000 WL 33200786 (Tenn. Cir. Ct.
July 5, 2000). In Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp., the plaintiffs sued under the TPA, alleging that
Microsofis anticompetitive conduct had a significant, direct impact within Tennessee. Id. at **1-
3. As in Mylan and Dzik, the defendants countered that the complaint should be dismissed be-
cause the challenged conduct was predominantly interstate in character. Id. at *1. Relying in
part upon the Blake decision, the Circuit Court of Tennessee sided with plaintiffs, holding that
injured indirect purchasers of Microsoft products have a viable cause of action under the TPA.
Id. at *7 CMhe complaint in this case is subject to a construction other than that the transac-
tions complained of predominantly affect interstate commerce ... "). Although the court essen-
tially adhered to a predominance standard and refused to adopt the broad, effects-based stan-
dard advanced by the plaintiffs (and advocated in this Note), the Sherwood court seemingly
opened the door to an expanded interpretation of the TPA. Id. at *7 (noting the limitations im-
posed by the Lynch and Blake decisions but suggesting that appellate courts might employ an
adverse impact test). The Sherwood decision thus constitutes further evidence that Tennessee
courts may be willing to adopt a broader construction of the state's antitrust laws than that
presented in Mylan.
173. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 666-68 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
174. Id.
175. See id. at 667 (agreeing with plaintiffs that Tennessee's antitrust laws "are not limited
to transactions that are wholly or predominantly intrastate in character").
176. Id. at 667.
177. See id. at 622-23 (describing the terms of the manufacturers' agreement).
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CD from competition. 178 In response, a class of indirect purchasers
of Cardizem CD sued both manufacturers under the Sherman Act
and various state antitrust laws. 179 Among the claims in the plain-
tiffs' complaint were charges that the manufacturers' agreement
constituted a per se violation of the TPA. °80 The defendant manu-
facturers sought dismissal, arguing that the TPA applies only to
transactions that are intrastate in character. 181 As in Mylan and
Dzik, the defendants claimed that their alleged anticompetitive
conduct predominantly affected interstate commerce; 182 therefore,
the defendants claimed, the plaintiffs could not possibly state a
claim under the TPA.183
The Cardizem court disagreed, holding that the plaintiffs'
claims were cognizable under Tennessee law. 84 Citing Standard Oil
for the proposition that Tennessee's antitrust laws, if they are to be
effective at all, must not be limited to disputes exclusively intra-
state in character, the court abandoned the "wholly or predomi-
nantly intrastate" standard. 85 In doing so, the court criticized the
narrow interpretation of the TPA employed in Lynch, Blake, Dzik,
and Mylan, and found these cases to be "wrongly decided." 186 As an
alternative, the Cardizem court employed an effects-based standard
seemingly building upon the "incidental effects" language that had
appeared previously in both Standard Oil and Lynch. 187 The court
predicted that the Tennessee Supreme Court, if presented with a
similar case, would agree that the plaintiffs raised viable claims
under Tennessee law:
The mere fact that there are allegations that Cardizem CD was sold in other states
... or that the anticompetitive conspiracy was hatched and implemented in other
states ...does not mean that Tennessee Plaintiffs, who allege they purchased
Cardizem CD in Tennessee at artificially inflated prices as a result of Defendant's
178. Id. at 623.
179. Id. at 622-27.
180. Id. at 625 n.3.
181. Id. at 666-67.
182. See id. at 667 (presenting defendants' argument that plaintiffs complaint "alleges anti.
competitive activity and restraints of trade occurring in several jurisdictions [and therefore that]
the Tennessee plaintiffs cannot possibly claim that the alleged restraints of trade in Tennessoo
predominantly affect Tennessee's intrastate commerce, as opposed to their 'predominantly' af.
fecting interstate commerce ... .
183. Id.
184. Id. at 668.
185. See id. at 667 C'[The Tennessee statutes at issue here are not limited to anticompetitivo
conspiracies that are hatched and implemented solely or predominantly in Tennessee; they do
not apply 'only to transactions that are intrastate in character ....
186. Id.
187. Id at 667-68; supra notes 156, 160 and accompanying text.
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anticompetitive conduct, are precluded from asserting a claim under Tennessee's
antitrust and consumer protection laws. Rather, the Tennessee Supreme Court
would find that a cognizable claim for relief under Tennessee's antitrust statute is
stated when the alleged facts show that an illegal combination or agreement more
than incidentally affects Tennessee's intrastate commerce.23
Although the Cardizem court did not elaborate upon the "in-
cidental effects" standard, or precisely define when this threshold
would be met, it made it clear that Tennessee's antitrust laws
should be applied to disputed agreements such as the one at issue
in the Cardizem case.18 9 There was no question, the court held, that
the TPA applied in "situations ... where anticompetitive conduct
may have occurred outside the state but results in a prescription
drug product intentionally coming to rest within Tennessee and
causing injury to Tennessee citizens .... ,190 Significantly, the facts
presented in Cardizem are extremely similar to those in Mylan,191
indicating that Judge Hogan's decision in that case rested on a
questionable interpretation of Tennessee law.
E. The Current Ambiguity
On its face, the TPA prohibits any schemes or agreements
"which tend to advance, reduce, or control the price or the cost to
the producer or the consumer" of products or articles "imported into
[Tennessee]."'192 Considering the plain language of the statute alone,
it would seem clear that the TPA in fact applies to conduct that is
interstate in nature, as long as there are some significant adverse
consequences for Tennessee producers or consumers. 93 Accepting
such a broad interpretation of the TPA, the Cardizem court indi-
cated its willingness to emphasize the consequences to in-state con-
sumers of out-of-state anticompetitive conduct. 194 In doing so, the
court preserved the viability of the TPA as a potent regulatory tool
188. Cardizem, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 667-68 (emphasis added). In a footnote, the Cardizem
court cited a recent Sixth Circuit opinion holding that federal courts construing questions of
state law "must attempt to ascertain how [the state's highest court] would rule if it were faced
with the issue." See id. at 668 n.23 (quoting Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kellman, 197 F.3d 1178,
1181 (6th Cir. 1999)).
189. Id. at 667.
190. Id.
191. In both cases, an anticompetitive agreement by pharmaceutical manufacturers led to in-
flated prices for prescription drugs, which seriously harmed Tennessee purchasers. Id. at 622-
25; FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 32-35 (D.D.C. 1999).
192. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-101.
193. See Cardizem, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 667 (relying in part on the plain language of the TPA
to conclude that the statute can be used to regulate anti-competitive conduct with more than
incidental state effects).
194. Id.
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while at the same time granting the victims of anticompetitive con-
duct an opportunity to obtain appropriate relief.
Overall, however, an analysis of case law interpreting Ten-
nessee precedent reveals a great deal of uncertainty regarding the
appropriate reach of the TPA. Much of this uncertainty stems from
the ambiguity in the Standard Oil decision. By stressing legislative
intent over literal meaning, the Standard Oil opinion limited the
ability of future courts to construe the TPA flexibly in response to
changing circumstances. 195 As a result, subsequent decisions-no-
tably Lynch, Dzik, and Mylan-have utilized a "predominantly in-
trastate" requirement as the appropriate standard.196 Unfortu-
nately, a standard based on "predominance" is indefinite and insuf-
ficient; and given the continued expansion of federal Commerce
Clause authority into the intrastate arena, such a standard is also
increasingly irrelevant. 197 Perhaps recognizing the deficiencies of
any standard based strictly upon "predominance," some courts have
applied Tennessee's antitrust laws to conduct that "more than inci-
dentally affects" intrastate commerce. 198 In the absence of legisla-
tive action, however, the precise reach of the TPA will remain un-
certain until the Tennessee Supreme Court provides a more definite
interpretation. More certain is the fact that the outdated inter-
state/intrastate paradigm has been abandoned, and that the proper
judicial approach to applying Tennessee antitrust law to interstate
commerce is not as clear cut as the Mylan decisions suggest.
V. GUIDANCE FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Faced with the problem of conceptualizing intrastate com-
merce for antitrust purposes, courts in other jurisdictions have sug-
gested more appealing approaches. On both the federal and state
levels, courts have construed state antitrust laws to be applicable to
interstate commerce in a variety of contexts. Most of these courts,
like the Eastern District of Michigan in the Cardizem case, stress
the consequences of anticompetitive conduct for in-state purchasers
and consumers. When these in-state effects are significant enough,
state antitrust laws should be applied, despite the interstate as-
pects of the underlying conduct.
195. See supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 158-72 and accompanying text.
197. See infra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
198. See Cardizem, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 667-68; supra notes 156, 160 and accompanying text.
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A. Emergency One v. Waterous: An Effects-Based Approach
Prior to Cardizem, one of the more thorough discussions of
the appropriate reach of state antitrust laws into the interstate
arena appeared in Emergency One, Inc. v. Waterous Co., Inc.S9 In
Emergency One, the District Court for the Eastern District of Wis-
consin addressed the scope of Wisconsin's antitrust statute ("Chap-
ter 133").200 Much of the court's opinion involved a discussion of the
standards that should be applied when determining whether anti-
trust plaintiffs present viable claims under Chapter 133 when the
conduct complained of arises in interstate commerce. 2 1 Like the
Eastern District of Michigan in Cardizem (and unlike the District of
D.C. in Mylan), the Emergency One court rejected a standard based
upon predominance. 2 2 Instead, the court adopted a standard based
on the adverse in-state effects of anticompetitive conduct.203
The challenged conduct in Emergency One involved vertical
and horizontal agreements among manufacturers of fire trucks and
fire pumps. 20 4 According to the plaintiffs, these alleged conspiracies
"choked the U.S. market for fire pumps," artificially inflated prices,
and restricted competition, all in violation of Chapter 133.205 As in
Mylan and Cardizem, the defendants moved for dismissal, claiming
that the conduct complained of was interstate in nature and thus
"flatly beyond the reach of state antitrust statutes and subject only
to federal law.120 6 While the court ultimately ruled in favor of dis-
missal,20 7 the analysis employed in the decision strongly supports
an expanded interpretation of state antitrust laws. 203
A major problem facing the court in Emergency One, similar
to the problem facing the courts that have attempted to interpret
and apply Tennessee law, was the absence of clear guidance from
199. Emergency One, Inc. v. Waterous Co., Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 959 (E.D. Wis 1998).
200. Id. at 961-70.
201. Id at 967-70.
202. Id. at 967-68.
203. Id. at 969-70.
204. Id. at 960-61. .[M]id-ship mounted fire pumps" are one of the "key components of the
fire trucks manufactured by the parties. Id. at 960.
205. See id. at 961 (laying out the specific allegations in plaintiffs amended complaint).
206. Id. at 962.
207. Id. at 970-71. In granting dismissal, the court noted that the plaintiffs complaint con-
cerned conduct "almost entirely interstate in nature." Id. at 970. To raise a cognizable claim,
though, the plaintiff needed only to allege "any significant adverse effects on trade and economic
competition with Wisconsin." Id. (emphasis added).
208. In support of its broad "adverse effects" standard, the court clarified that "plaintiffs al-
legations are not cognizable under Wisconsin antitrust law, not because they depict predomi-
nantly interstate transactions, but because they do not allege significant and adverse effects on
economic competition in Wisconsin." Id. at 971.
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the Wisconsin Supreme Court.20 9 The lack of controlling precedent
led the court to examine a line of cases discussing the appropriate
scope of Chapter 133 and its predecessor legislation.2 10 As in Ten-
nessee, the earliest decision addressing the proper relationship be-
tween Wisconsin's antitrust statute and the federal antitrust laws,
Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper, appeared in the early twentieth
century.2 11 Significantly, the Emergency One court noted that this
early decision, like Standard Oil in Tennessee, did not mandate
mutually exclusive application of state and federal law in the anti-
trust context.2 12 Unfortunately (and again, like Standard Oil) the
Pulp Wood decision failed to articulate a definite standard.213 As in
Tennessee, the resulting ambiguity presented a problematic situa-
tion for Wisconsin courts charged with interpreting state antitrust
law and its application to interstate commerce.
Two subsequent developments, however, one judicial and one
legislative, helped to give the Emergency One court some
direction. 214 First, in 1960 the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued a
decision, State v. Allied Chemical, which rejected the defendants'
argument that the state's antitrust law conflicted with federal law
and unduly burdened interstate commerce. 215 In Allied Chemical,
according to the court in Emergency One, the state supreme court
209. See id. at 966-67 (noting that the state supreme court "has never spoken directly to the
question" of proper application of Chapter 133). The court added, "in the absence of direct state
precedent, I evaluate this matter as I believe the Wisconsin Supreme Court would if asked to do
so." Id. at 967.
210. Id. at 964-66.
211. Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 147 N.W. 1058 (1914).
212. See Emergency One, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 964 (pointing out that the Pulp Wood decision
"does not unequivocally bar the simultaneous application of state antitrust law, although such a
stance would have been entirely in keeping with the prevailing federal constitutional law of the
time").
213. Id. The Emergency One court noted that "subsequent cases have tended to cite Pulp
Wood summarily for the proposition that Wisconsin antitrust law ... applies 'to intrastate as
distinguished from interstate transactions.'" Id. The court added, however, that "[w]hen state
courts have paused to consider the application of Chapter 133 to facts clearly involving interstate
commerce.., the line is not so clearly drawn." Id.
214. Id. at 962-66.
215. State v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 101 N.W.2d 133, 134 (1960). The Allied Chemical
court had stated:
The public interest and welfare of the people of Wisconsin are substantially af-
fected if prices of a product are fixed or supplies thereof are restricted as the
result of an illegal combination or conspiracy. The people of Wisconsin are en-
titled to the advantages that flow from free competition in the purchase of [cer-
tain] products, and if the state is able to prove the allegations made in its com-
plaint it is apparent that the acts of the defendant deny to them those advan-
tages.
Id. at 134.
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had assumed that "defendants' conspiratorial acts-both in and out
of Wisconsin-may be subject to Chapter 133 under certain circum-
stances."216 Second, in 1980 the Wisconsin legislature passed sig-
nificant amendments to Chapter 133.217 These amendments, which
included an explicit provision creating a cause of action for indirect
purchasers, 218 reflected a legislative assumption that Chapter 133
reached interstate conduct.219 Together, the effects of the 1980
amendments and the Wisconsin Supreme Court's position in Allied
Chemical led the Emergency One court to conclude that Wisconsin's
antitrust law could be applied to interstate commerce.2 0
Having reached this conclusion, the court set out to establish
an appropriate standard for determining more precisely the scope of
Chapter 133.221 Among the options the court analyzed were a "pre-
dominance" standard (similar to the standard utilized in Lynch,
Dzik, and Mylan) and an "adverse effects" standard.2 The Emer-
gency One court's analysis of these potential standards is extremely
instructive in that it illustrates the significant deficiencies of any
approach based on "predominance"; at the same time, it highlights
the positive attributes of a standard emphasizing adverse in-state
effects.
In criticizing the predominance approach, the Emergency
One court first observed, contrary to the defendants' arguments,
that Wisconsin precedent did not establish that "predominance"
216. Emergency One, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 966 (emphasis added).
217. See id. at 962-64 (discussing the details of the 1980 amendments and their impact on
the scope of Chapter 133).
218. This provision represented an explicit rejection of the Supreme Court's decision in Illi-
nois Brick, which limited recovery of damages under the federal antitrust laws to direct purchas-
ers. Id. at 964. For a discussion of the Illinois Brick decision, see supra notes 47-51 and accom-
panying text.
219. See id. at 964 ("To the extent that the state indirect purchaser claim was meant to re-
place the lost federal cause of action... the 1980 amendments clearly assume that Chapter 133
may reach interstate commerce.").
220. See id. at 966 (concluding that "the Wisconsin Supreme Court has for some time inter-
preted the state antitrust statutes to reach interstate activities ... and has rejected a mutually
exclusive vision of state/federal antitrust enforcement").
221. Id. at 967.
222. See id. at 967-70 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of the potential standards).
The Emergency One court also analyzed a contacts-based standard grounded in legislative juris-
diction and choice of law doctrine. See id. at 968-69. The court refused to adopt such a contacts-
based standard, however, cautioning that "[a] state's choice-of-law interest in the outcome of
litigation may rest on a number of general considerations having nothing to do with antitrust
law. Thus... a contacts-based standard may permit the application of state antitrust law in
situations where trades or economic competition within the state have not been significantly
injured." Id. at 969. Because the Emergency One court did not feel that a contacts-based stan-
dard would further the legislative objective behind Chapter 133, it did not believe that Wisconsin
courts would adopt such a standard. See id.
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was the appropriate standard. 223 Rather, the court noted, any re-
quirement that alleged anticompetitive conduct be "predominantly
intrastate" in character reflects a misunderstanding of the relation-
ship between state and federal antitrust laws. 224 A standard focused
on predominance, the court explained, implied a mutual exclusivity
of remedies; but such exclusiveness, as noted previously, is contrary
to the legislative intent behind both state and federal antitrust
laws.225 "[A] careful reading of Wisconsin cases," the court stated,
"does not support the thesis that either state or federal antitrust
law, but not both, may apply to a given antitrust action. And in-
deed, that is what a standard focused on predominance must imply.
An action cannot be both predominantly interstate in nature and
predominantly intrastate in nature; it must be one or the other."226
The Emergency One court thus recognized that even anticompeti-
tive conduct that is fairly described as "predominantly" interstate
in nature can result in serious harm to intrastate commerce;227 and
since the prevention of such harm is a legitimate objective of state
legislatures, state antitrust laws should remain available as poten-
tial remedies whether or not the underlying conduct is predomi-
nantly intrastate in nature.228
Having rejected a "predominance" approach, the Emergency
One court indicated its preference for a standard that would "ex-
tend the jurisdictional scope of the Wisconsin antitrust law to un-
lawful activity which has significantly and adversely affected trade
and economic competition within this state."229 The court empha-
sized that a standard based on adverse effects was both faithful to
the "clear legislative directive" behind Chapter 133230 and consis-
tent with state and federal precedent. 231 Therefore, the court pre-
dicted that Wisconsin state courts would follow an adverse effects
standard if asked to consider the proper application of Chapter 133
223. Id. at 967.
224. Id. at 967-68.
225. Id. (holding that "a standard which results in the mutually exclusive application of state
and federal antitrust law is contrary to Congressional intent and Supreme Court Precedent).
See also infra Part II.A.
226. See Emergency One, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (adding that "framing the issue as one of pro-
dominance.., becomes a way of reintroducing federal preemption of state antitrust law-a re-
sult consistently rejected by the Supreme Court').
227. Id. at 968.
228. Id. C'[A] predominance standard does not advance... [a state's] legitimate interest in
providing a remedy for citizens injured by monopolistic interstate activity.").
229. Id. at 969.
230. See id. at 969-70 (citing the legislative objectives laid out in Chapter 133).
231. Id.
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to interstate conduct. 2 2 The court also recognized that an effects-
based standard comports with the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the appropriate reach the federal antitrust laws in relation to
foreign or extraterritorial transactions.23 3 Noting that the federal
antitrust laws have been applied to extraterritorial conduct as long
as there are significant anticompetitive effects within the U.S., 234
the Emergency One court concluded that "[tihere is no reason that
the effects-based logic of these federal cases should not then govern
the question of which interstate transactions constitute unlawful
activity under Chapter 133."235 Overall, the Emergency One "signifi-
cant adverse effects" standard represents an improved approach to
the problem of defining the scope of state antitrust laws. By empha-
sizing adverse in-state effects, the court's reasoning constitutes an
excellent example of judicial willingness to preserve the viability of
state laws as a means of mitigating the harmful effects of anticom-
petitive conduct. "Ultimately," as the Emergency One court held,
"an adverse effects standard is the only standard that remains
faithful to the purpose of state antitrust laws-to protect and en-
courage competition in this state, by paralyzing interstate activities
that adversely affect it."236
B. In Re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation:
Posner's Approach
Another example of a more progressive decision on the fed-
eral level is Judge Posner's opinion in In re Brand Name Prescrip-
tion Drugs Antitrust Litigation.23 7 This complex case involved mul-
tiple claims of a price-fixing scheme by drug manufacturers. 2  The
plaintiffs claimed this conspiracy violated Alabama antitrust provi-
sions, 239 but the district court agreed with the defendants that the
case could be removed to federal court.240 In reversing the lower
232. Id.
233. Id. at 970.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1997).
238. For a summary of the facts behind the alleged conspiracy and the case's procedural his-
tory, see id. at 603-07.
239. ALA. CODE § 6-5-60(a) (1975).
240. See Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 123 F.3d at 607. The District Court based its re-
moval decision on both diversity jurisdiction and the "artful pleading" doctrine. Id. Under the
artful pleading doctrine, a plaintiff cannot characterize a claim as falling under state law if fed-
eral law "has so far occupied a field of disputes as to extinguish any basis in state law for seeking
a resolution of the dispute... " Id. at 611; see also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,
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court's removal decision, Judge Posner confirmed that Congress did
not intend to preempt state antitrust laws. 241 He stressed that
"states are free to enact their own antitrust laws, reaching the
same conduct as the federal laws, except insofar as the states'
power to regulate economic activities in other states in limited by..
the federal Constitution."242 Given the evolution of constitutional
law over the past century, the recognition of the considerable over-
lap in the state and federal antitrust schemes is unremarkable.
Posner's defense of the plaintiffs' state antitrust claims, however, is
more enlightening.
Despite precedent suggesting that Alabama's antitrust laws
applied only to intrastate commerce, 243 and although it was doubt-
ful that any of the alleged price-fixed sales occurred intrastate,244
Posner argued that the plaintiffs nonetheless made legitimate state
law claims for relief.245 In explanation, Posner offered the following
analysis of the defendant's claim that recovery was unavailable to
the plaintiffs under state antitrust law:
The cases on which defendants rely . . . date from a period in which, interstate
commerce being narrowly defined, and federal power to regulate such commerce
being deemed exclusive, a state statute limited to intrastate commerce ... could
not have a greater scope no matter how much the state wanted it to. The cases
thus were not interpreting the statute; they were interpreting the Constitution as
placing upper and lower bounds on the reach of the statute, and the Constitution
has since been reinterpreted. If the statute is limited today as it once was to com-
merce that is not within the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce
clause, it is a dead letter because there are virtually no sales, in Alabama or any-
where else in the United States, that are intrastate in that sense. 246
393 (1987); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987). In other words, a plaintiff
may not disguise federal claims as state law claims in order to obtain more favorable relief.
Significantly, though, the artful pleading applies only when federal law is the sole ground for
obtaining relief. See Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 123 F.3d at 611. The issue before Judge
Posner thus involved the appropriate application of the artful pleading doctrine to plaintiffs'
state antitrust claims. See id. CThe problem comes in setting limits to the doctrine."). Conclud-
ing that Alabama state law afforded relief independent of the remedies available under federal
law, Posner held that the artful pleading doctrine did not require removal. Id. at 611-13.
241. Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 123 F.3d at 611.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 612-13 (citing cases relied upon by defendants).
244. See id. at 612 (observing that it was "doubtful that any of the price-fixed sales attacked
in the suit took place in intrastate rather than interstate commerce").
245. In Abbott Laboratories v. Durrett, 746 So. 2d 316, 337-39 (Ala. 1999), the Alabama Su-
preme Court subsequently ruled that Alabama's antitrust law does not provide a cause of action
for damages resulting from an interstate conspiracy to control the price of prescription drugs.
While the Abbott decision may have resolved, for the time being, the issue of the proper scope of
Alabama's antitrust law, Judge Posner's analysis remains applicable to state antitrust laws in
general.
246. Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 123 F.3d at 612-13 (emphasis in original).
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Of course, the reach of state laws is not unlimited. Accord-
ingly, Judge Posner verified that states cannot regulate sales or
commercial transactions taking place entirely beyond state
borders. 247 Posner nevertheless suggested that when a "nontrivial"
number of transactions appreciably impact in-state interests, state
regulation is entirely appropriate. 248 The significance of Posner's
opinion thus lies in the clear implication that if state antitrust laws
are to have any meaningful effect, their reach should extend at
least to anticompetitive conduct that has significant in-state effects.
From this perspective, judicial emphasis upon the precise timing
and location of anticompetitive agreements appears misguided.
C. Local Wisdom: State Court Opinions
Expanded application of state antitrust laws finds support in
several state court decisions. Like the Brand Name Prescription
Drug opinion, these decisions abandon outdated notions of mutually
exclusive state and federal antitrust jurisdiction. Echoing Judge
Posner's concern with preserving the efficacy of state law, they also
suggest that the local consequences of anticompetitive agreements
deserve considerable attention.
1. California
California's leadership in this area is exemplified in R.E.
Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co. 249 In Spriggs, the California Court
of Appeals reversed a lower court's dismissal of an action brought
under California's antitrust law, the Cartwright Act.2 0 Notable for
its treatment of the jurisdictional and preemption issues arising
under principles of federal supremacy,255 the Spriggs decision
makes an important contribution through its emphasis upon the
overlapping nature of state and federal antitrust laws.2-5 2 Recog-
nizing that the goals of the two antitrust schemes are mutually re-
247. Id. at 613.
248. See id. (arguing that plaintiffs' suit survives scrutiny under the artful pleading doctrine
because it challenges sales to in-state pharmacies).
249. R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
250. Id. at 666. For the relevant provisions of the Cartwright Act, see CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE §§ 16720, 16726, 16750(a) (West 1997).
251. See RE. Spriggs, 37 Cal. App. 3d at 657-60 (considering and rejecting respondent's
claims of field and conflict preemption).
252. Id.
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inforcing rather than mutually exclusive, 253 the court indicated that
standards governing the proper reach of state antitrust laws into
the federal sphere may legitimately vary from the jurisdictional
limitations applied in other areas of the law.25 4 From this perspec-
tive, state antitrust laws-because they effectively protect inter-
state commerce as an inevitable consequence of the effort to pre-
serve and promote competition within state borders-should per-
haps play an even greater role within the federal system.255 As the
Spriggs court concluded, "where the effect of the application of
[state antitrust laws] upon interstate commerce is to facilitate com-
petition and not to place a restraint upon it, it is one which con-
forms with like policies of the federal government, and the state
courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action." 56
In St. Joe Paper Co. v. Superior Court, the California courts
again addressed the issue of proper application of the Cartwright
Act.257 The case involved allegations of a price-fixing conspiracy
among out-of-state paper companies. 258 The court first determined
whether the business intentionally conducted by the defendants in
California satisfied the "minimum contacts" and "substantial jus-
tice" jurisdictional tests established under federal precedent.25 9
Here the court turned for guidance to an earlier federal decision
holding that "if a person engages in an out-of-state conspiracy that
is designed to and affects the prices charged in the forum state, the
253. See id. at 662 (describing the case as "a situation in which both the state and federal
governments have a stake in the outcome"); see also Younger v. Jensen, 605 P.2d 813, 818 (Cal.
1980) (observing the considerable overlap between the coverage of the Sherman Act and that of
the Cartwright Act).
254. See R.E. Spriggs, 37 Cal. App. 3d at 661 n.10 CRegulation of business practices through
the antitrust laws... may justifiably reach further than some other types of regulation because
the antitrust laws are concerned directly with aiding the flow of commerce.").
255. See id. at 660 n.9 (proposing that "concurrent regulation is preferable [in order] to
lessen the opportunity for antitrust violators to escape in a failure between state and federal
authorities to exert a power of prosecution"). The court further noted that "elimination of this
twilight zone of nonenforcement was a long sought goal of both state and federal authorities."
Id. Judge Hogans dismissal in Mylan may constitute an apt example of a decision falling
squarely within this "twilight zone of non-enforcement." See also Commonwealth v. McHugh, 93
N.E.2d 751, 762 (Mass. 1950) (warning presciently that a state should be "thoroughly convinced"
before abandoning jurisdiction in areas traditionally subject to state regulation, "lest it discover
later that it has retreated where the Federal government will not advance and has therefore
been derelict in its duty").
256. R.E. Spriggs, 37 Cal. App. 3d at 666.
257. St. Joe Paper Co. v. Superior Ct., 120 Cal. App. 3d 991 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
258. Id. at 995.
259. See id. at 995-96 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)); see also su-
pra note 39 and accompanying text. The St. Joe Paper opinion thus centered primarily upon the
appropriate reach of California's long-arm statute as applied to out-of-state conspirators.
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forum state has jurisdiction of the conspirators."260 Accordingly, be-
cause the defendants had availed themselves of the advantages of
doing business in California, and since their alleged price-fixing
conspiracy allowed them to reap extraordinary windfall profits "at
the expense of California consumers," they were subject to the ju-
risdiction of state laws, including the Cartwright Act.261 Again, the
court stressed the importance of the consequences of illegal anti-
competitive conduct (to in-state consumers in the form of higher
prices and to the out-of-state conspirators in the form of foreseeable
economic benefit) rather than the factual circumstances (e.g., tim-
ing, location, etc.) surrounding consummation of the challenged
agreement.
In Younger v. Jensen, the California Supreme Court consid-
ered the scope of the state attorney general's authority to investi-
gate alleged violations of the Cartwright Act.262 Specifically, the
case concerned the Attorney General's ability to conduct investiga-
tions into activity by defendants that affected the California market
for natural gas.263 Because this natural gas originated in Alaska,
the attorney general's investigation involved both interstate and
intrastate aspects. 264 Rejecting defendants' claims that various fed-
eral acts precluded investigation by state authorities,26 the court
emphasized the overlapping nature of the state and federal anti-
trust schemes. 266 Rather than engaging in jurisdictional power
struggles, the court implied that state and federal authorities
should cooperate in order to combat anticompetitive conduct.2 7s
State laws such as the Cartwright Act comprise important tools in
this effort, and nothing in the Constitution or the federal antitrust
statutes "prevents those state laws from reaching transactions that
have interstate aspects but significantly affect state interests." 26s
260. St. Joe Paper, 120 Cal. App. 3d at 997 (citing Maricopa County v. Am. Petrofina, Inc.,
322 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1971)).
261. Id. at 999-1000.
262. Younger v. Jensen, 605 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
263. Id. at 816-17.
264. Id. at 818.
265. See id. at 820 (rejecting defendants' Supremacy Clause arguments and stating that "[a]
federal regulatory act does not preempt harmonious state regulation").
266. Id. at 818.
267. Id. at 818-19.
268. Id. at 818 (emphasis added).
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2. Other States
A Missouri court confirmed that in-state consequences are of
primary concern in C. Bennett Building Supplies, Inc. v. Jenn Air
Corporation.2 69 Here, the plaintiff sought $1.8 million in damages
under Missouri's antitrust law;270 but the trial court dismissed,
agreeing with defendants that the plaintiffs claim was not valid
under state law since the challenged conduct took place in inter-
state commerce. 271 The appeals court reversed, applying the bal-
ancing test outlined in Pike v. Bruce Church272 and concluding that
the law's local benefit outweighed any burden on interstate com-
merce. 273 Summarizing the authority supporting its decision, the
court announced that even when interstate commerce is affected,
"antitrust violations may also be prohibited by state antitrust law
provided some state trade or commerce is affected and personal ju-
risdiction may be had."274 The Jenn Air analysis would therefore
seemingly support application of state antitrust laws to any trans-
action with a recognizable in-state impact.275 Absent a direct con-
flict with federal law or a demonstrable impediment to interstate
competition, this proactive standard represents an effective means
of affording antitrust victims an adequate remedy.
In a decision preceding Jenn Air by nearly a quarter century,
the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Sterling Theatres
reached a similar conclusion regarding the extent to which state
antitrust laws may regulate interstate commercial conduct.276 The
court considered a suit challenging state efforts to enforce recently
enacted antitrust legislation against four groups of motion picture
exhibitors.2 7 The court reversed the trial judge's dismissal, reject-
ing defendant's claims of Sherman Act preemption.2 78 In doing so,
the Sterling court emphasized "the existence of [a] predominantly
269. C. Bennett Bldg. Supplies, Inc. v. Jenn Air Corp., 759 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
270. Id. at 886.
271. Id. at 886.
272. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
273. Jenn Air, 759 S.W.2d at 889-91.
274. Id. at 890 (emphasis added).
275. The court recognized two potential limitations on this seemingly broad standard. Any
state regulation is inapplicable, the court explained, if it "substantially impedes" interstate
commerce, or if the subject of the regulation is an area demanding "national uniformity." Id. at
889.
276. State v. Sterling Theatres Co., 394 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1964).
277. Id. at 227. The state's complaint against the defendants included claims of monopoliza-
tion of feature film runs in the Seattle area as well as illegal market division of such films on a
pre-arranged basis. Id.
278. Id. at 228-29.
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local interest" and concluded that as justification for enforcement,
these interests outweighed any apparent burden on interstate
commerce.
279
Again, in contrast to the anachronistic reasoning reflected in
the Mylan decision, the Sterling court refused to recognize a stark
distinction between interstate and intrastate conduct. Similarly,
courts in Nebraska, New Jersey, and Massachusetts have jettisoned
a strict state/federal dichotomy in favor of the balancing approach
employed in the cases above.2 0 In aggregate, the decisions of these
state courts support an expanded application of state antitrust laws
into the interstate arena.
VI. TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE STANDARD
Courts that have maintained a strict interpretation of state
antitrust laws have relied heavily upon legislative intent and tradi-
tional notions of state authority within the federal scheme.2 1 Un-
fortunately, their approach is largely based upon standards and
principles announced in cases nearly a century old and of question-
able viability today.2 2 As an example, the Tennessee decisions dis-
cussed in Part IV relied heavily upon the analysis employed by the
Tennessee Supreme Court in its 1907 decision in Standard Oil.2 3
Similarly, as noted in Emergency One, Wisconsin courts frequently
turned to the approach taken in the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
1914 Pulp Wood opinion.24 Adhering to the precedent established
in such early decisions, some courts have refused to extend the ap-
279. Id. at 228.
280. See Health Consultants, Inc. v. Precision Instruments, Inc., 527 N.W. 2d 59G, 607 (Neb.
1995) (applying Pike balancing test and concluding that the "impact upon local residents" of the
challenged conduct supported application of Nebraska's antitrust statute); State v. Lawn King,
Inc., 417 A-2d 1025, 1032 (N.J. 1980) (holding that New Jersey's antitrust law was not pre-
empted by federal law); Commonwealth v. McHugh, 93 N.E.2d 751, 761-62 (Mass. 1950) (empha-
sizing the continued viability of state antitrust laws after the Sherman Act).
281. See, e.g., Kosuga v. Kelly, 257 F.2d 48, 55 (7th Cir. 1958); Abbott Labs. v. Durrett, 746
So. 2d 316, 337-39 (Ala. 1999); Young v. Seaway Pipeline, Inc., 576 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Okla. 1977);
Standard Oil Co. v. State, 100 S.W. 705, 709.12 Crenn. 1907).
282. See Abbott, 746 So. 2d at 337-39 (holding that "the field of operation of Alabama% anti-
trust statutes ... is no greater today than it was when the laws were first enacted"). The Abbott
court held that Alabama's antitrust law did not provide a cause of action for damages resulting
from an agreement to control the price of goods shipped in interstate commerce. Id. In doing so,
the court relied heavily upon the legislative intent behind Alabama's earliest antitrust statutes,
which were "first enacted at a time in this country's history when the United States Supreme
Court maintained a clear dichotomy with respect to a state's power to regulate commerce." Id. at
335.
283. Standard Oil v. State, 100 S.W. 705, 709-12 (Tenn. 1907); see also supra Parts IV.B-C.
284. See Emergency One, Inc. v. Waterous Co., 23 F. Supp. 2d 959, 965 (E.D. Wise. 1998); see
also supra Part IV.A.
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plication of state antitrust laws into the realm of interstate com-
merce. 285 Instead, they have persisted in an attempt to be faithful to
the presumed legislative intent behind the earliest antitrust stat-
utes.286 Because state legislatures at the beginning of the twentieth
century were aware of the recently enacted Sherman Act, and since
they were presumably familiar with the limited reach of state
authority under the Commerce Clause, they could not have in-
tended state laws to apply to interstate conduct. 287 Accordingly,
courts advocating a traditional interpretation of state antitrust
laws have generally confined their reach to transactions or agree-
ments either "solely" or "predominantly" intrastate in character.2 88
Proper application of state antitrust laws, however, may ul-
timately depend little upon whether the challenged conduct is
"wholly," "predominantly," or "substantially" either intrastate or
interstate in nature. 289 As the Emergency One opinion illustrates,
standards such as these are inherently problematic because they
result in mutually exclusive application of state and federal law.290
Such exclusivity is inappropriate given the purpose and objectives
of antitrust laws.291 As emphasized by the California courts in
Spriggs, state and federal antitrust laws are designed to achieve
similar goals; primary among them is the protection of a competi-
tive marketplace.29 2 Thus, there is little merit in rendering state
antitrust laws impotent in cases where the conduct or agreement
allegedly violating the state law is "predominantly" or "substan-
tially" interstate in character.
Rather, as cases such as Cardizem CD, Emergency One, and
Brand Name Prescription Drugs suggest, the effect of anticompeti-
tive conduct upon local interests deserves primary consideration.
An extension of the reasoning in these cases should form the basis
285. Kosuga, 257 F.2d at 55; FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 1999), re-
considered in part by FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999); Abbott, 746 So. 2d
at 337-39; Young, 576 P.2d at 1151.
286. Abbott, 746 So. 2d at 337-39; Standard Oil, 100 S.W. at 709-12.
287. Standard Oil, 100 S.W. at 710.
288. See Mylan, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 42 ('solely"); Mylan, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 9 ('predominantly");
Abbott, 746 So. 2d at 337-39 ('within the geographic boundaries of the state"); Lynch, 640 S.W.2d
at 840 ('predominantly"); Dzik & Dzik, P.C. v. Vision Serv. Plan, 1989 WL 3082, *2 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Jan 20, 1989) ('predominantly").
289. As seen in Tennessee cases discussed above, courts have continued to use such terms
when framing standards for the application of state antitrust laws, even though these terms
appear nowhere in the text of the statutes themselves.
290. Emergency One, Inc. v. Waterous Co., 23 F. Supp. 2d 959, 967-68 (E.D. Wisc. 1998).
291. Id.
292. R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 653, 660 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
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for future determinations of whether state laws can be applied to
alleged antitrust violations. At the outset, courts considering state
antitrust claims should determine whether in-state interests (e.g.,
consumers, direct or indirect purchasers, or state agencies) have, in
the aggregate, suffered significant, discernible economic or competi-
tive harm due to violations of state antitrust law.23 If the aggregate
local effect of the challenged conduct is discernibly "nontrivial,"
then the state provision should apply.294 If the state law protects
competition and does not favor in-state interests over those of out-
of-state competitors, the law should stand, regardless of the extent
to which interstate commerce is involved or of the location or timing
of the challenged conduct.29 5 As long as the defendant or defendants
have directed their conduct toward in-state purchasers or consum-
ers, and if they have established minimum contacts sufficient to
satisfy the forum state's long-arm statute, application of state anti-
trust laws appears entirely appropriate.
Alternatively, states should be free to regulate any intra-
state aspects of harmful, anticompetitive behavior. In other words,
whenever anticompetitive conduct violates a state antitrust law on
its face, the law should apply to any aspects of that conduct that
have adverse in-state effects. Again, the emphasis here is upon af-
fording an adequate remedy to in-state victims of unlawful con-
spiracies, combinations or agreements.2 6 Under an "intrastate as-
pects" standard, however, the fact that the challenged conduct is
"primarily" or "significantly" interstate in nature becomes irrele-
vant. Any negative in-state consequences would be enough to jus-
tify application of state antitrust laws, and the details of the un-
293. When making this determination, courts should of course take into account the legisla-
tive intent and policy interests behind the statutes themselves. In doing so, however, courts
cannot ignore the social, economic, and constitutional realities that constantly demand judicial
reassessment of legislative intent.
294. See supra text accompanying note 238.
295. In spite of the Mylan and Standard Oil decisions, the fact that the challenged conduct
occurred beyond the geographic borders of the state, or before overpriced products crossed state
lines, should not be a prevailing concern. But see Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43
(1982) (stating that the Commerce Clause "precludes the application of a state statute to com-
merce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has
effects within the State"). The Edgar decision, the product of a sharply divided Court, is distin-
guishable from cases such as CTS and Exxon since it apparently rested on a finding that the
Illinois statute in question was at bottom a protectionist measure designed to primarily to serve
in-state interests. See id. at 642 (characterizing the Illinois statute as "a direct restraint on
interstate commerce" having "a sweeping extraterritorial effect").
296. The desire to provide an adequate remedy to persons or business in-state should not be
characterized as protectionism. As long as state statutes regulate even-handedly, with no dis-
crimination against interstate commerce or preference to in-state competitors, they should be
upheld against any claims of protectionist intent.
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derlying conduct would no longer be determinative.2 97 Given the
general reluctance on the part of courts to hold state antitrust laws
preempted under notions of federal supremacy, an "intrastate as-
pects" approach to state regulation should create few, if any, consti-
tutional problems. 298
To the extent that challenges to state antitrust laws arise
under the negative Commerce Clause, the most relevant inquiry
becomes whether the perceived impact of the regulation upon inter-
state commerce is procompetitive. 299 This inquiry essentially re-
quires application of the Pike balancing test. The reviewing court
must therefore weigh the burden on interstate commerce against
the strength of the local interests served by the statute. 00 Because
state antitrust statutes are designed to protect and enhance free
and fair commercial competition, these "local interests" will gener-
ally be procompetitive in nature. 3°1 Therefore, under any type of
297. This approach may in fact represent a natural outgrowth of Cardizem, Emergency One,
Brand Name Drugs, and some of the more progressive state court opinions discussed abovo. As
an example of the potential benefits of this standard, had it been employed in Mylan, the court
might have interpreted Tennessee law as allowing recovery for all sales in Tennessee of the
artificially overpriced lorazepam and clorazepate tablets.
298. One of the more persuasive counter-arguments to expanded application of state law fo-
cuses on the benefits of predictability and national uniformity in the law. If individual states are
free to regulate the conduct of the same defendant under various standards, these objectives may
in fact be frustrated. The Supreme Courts stance against preemption, however, is the obvious
rebuttal to these concerns. If either Congress or the Supreme Court viewed national uniformity
of antitrust laws as essential, federal preemption would be the rule. Since it is not, we can as-
sume a preference for independent state regulation, despite any potential effects on predictabil-
ity or uniformity. The same can be said in response to arguments that enhanced state regulation
may in some cases result in double liability for antitrust violators.
299. Judicial focus on the pro- or anti-competitive nature of alleged statutory burdens on
commerce would be entirely consistent with the current standards governing antitrust chal.
lenges to private restraints on commerce. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999)
(confirming that the "essential inquiry" in antitrust cases is "whether or not the challenged re-
straint enhances competition").
300. As a potential model analysis, the balancing test employed in Jenn Air, with its empha-
sis on "local consequences," represents a sensible approach that granted an in-state plaintiff the
opportunity to recover the damages lost due to defendants' interference with fair trade. C.
Bennett Bldg. Supplies, Inc. v. Jenn Air Corp., 759 S.W.2d 883, 890 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
301. As some commentators have noted, the nature of free competition is such that it is diffi-
cult, and perhaps illogical, to characterize procompetitive antitrust statutes as serving only
"local" interests. See Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 388 ('Theoretically, every price-fixing con-
spiracy in the United States injures everyone in the United States."). Perhaps for this reason,
some observers have questioned whether, absent a clear discriminatory or protectionist intent,
the negative Commerce Clause should impose any scrutiny at all on state regulation of interstate
commerce. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 108, at 322. For a Supreme Court opinion that
may indicate the Court's reluctance to apply the Pike balancing test in negative Commerce
Clause cases in general, see CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987) ('The
principle objects of dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against
interstate commerce.").
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balancing test, the "burden" imposed on interstate commerce by
state antitrust laws will invariably be lower than in the case of
most other types of statutes. 302 In this regard, courts should per-
haps grant state antitrust laws special consideration when assess-
ing their propriety under the negative Commerce Clause.
VII. CONCLUSION
Total restrictions on the authority of states to enforce their
antitrust laws in the interstate arena are misguided in a modern
context. A full and fair consideration of the legislative intent behind
the federal antitrust laws reveals the insistence of the drafters that
these provisions were not designed to preempt analogous state laws
protecting fair trade and competition. The advantages of comple-
mentary and overlapping state and federal antitrust laws within
our unique system of government have since been confirmed in nu-
merous cases, including several by the Supreme Court. These cases
establish that preemption analysis under either the Supremacy
clause or the negative Commerce Clause, at least as traditionally
applied, may be inappropriate in modern antitrust disputes.
Decisions such as Cardizem, Emergency One, Brand Name
Drugs, Spriggs, and Jenn Air indicate the desirability of applying
state antitrust laws as broadly as permissible under the Constitu-
tion. In focusing on the local, in-state consequences of illegal anti-
competitive conduct, these opinions address the real issues involved
in antitrust disputes and ultimately serve the true objectives lying
at the core of state antitrust statutes. They also avoid the pitfalls
associated with blind adherence to a rigid, anachronistic inter-
state/intrastate dichotomy, which, appropriate at the turn of the
last century, is inconsistent with the social values and legal and
economic realities of a new millennium.
The problems and issues addressed in this Note could per-
haps be resolved easily through legislative amendment of state an-
titrust statutes, which would clarify both their purpose and the ex-
tent of their reach. Indeed, to the extent that judicial interpreta-
tions of state law lag behind the times, it may in fact be the duty of
the legislatures to forge appropriate statutory responses. Given the
broad language employed in many of these provisions, however,
state lawmakers might understandably remain content with the
laws as they are currently written. Establishing an effective stan-
302. Outside the realm of antitrust, most state regulations involve exercise of the police
power of the states in areas that are more fairly described as "primarily local in nature."
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dard for interpretation and application of state antitrust laws is
therefore largely, perhaps primarily, a judicial responsibility.
Judges have frequently been called upon to mold existing law to
address contemporary needs, and they have done so. In the case of
state antitrust laws, the judiciary should take a similarly proactive
stance to afford in-state antitrust victims an appropriate remedy.
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